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What's Next for Wayne Dick? The Next Phase of
the Debate over College Hate Speech Codes*
MATMW SILVERSTEN
Our nation's colleges and universities have traditionally been a haven for
the free interchange of ideas. In recent years our nation's campuses have
experienced a tremendous increase in the number of verbal, physical, and
political attacks on members of minority groups. In an attempt to curb the rise of
hate on campus, administrators have begun passing hate speech codes, which
punish members of the university community who promote hate. The enactment
of campus speech regulations implicates the First Amendment and has sparked
serious debate over the wisdom and constitutionality of such regulations.
Regardless of the reason a university decides to adopt a speech code, it must
develop a code that can withstand constitutional scrutiny because these
regulations implicate the First Amendment.
This note begins with the story of Wayne Dick a Yale University
sophomore, who was punished by the school for expressing his opinion on Gay
and Lesbian Awareness Days. Needless to say, many at Yale did not believe
Dick's opinion should be expressed on campus. Wayne Dick's story provides a
good overview of the issues raised by both sides of the campus hate speech code
debate Next, the note examines early constitutional justifications for campus
speech regulations and how the federal court system rejected these justifications.
Finally, the author proposes a possible constitutionally acceptable framework
for limiting speech on college campuses and analyzes Wayne Dick's situation
under this proposedframework
* This note received the Donald S. Teller Memorial Award for the student writing that
contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal.
** I would like to dedicate this note to my grandfather, Irving William Silversten, a man
who has taught me that every day is a new opportunity to live, learn, and grow. I would like to
thank my colleague and friend, Eric Bono, for his tremendous help in preparing this article for
publication.
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I have always been among those who believed that the greatest
freedom of speech was the greatest safety, because if a man is a fool,
the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by
speaking. It cannot be so easily discovered ifyou allow him to remain
silent and look wise, but ifyou let him speak, the secret is out and the
world knows that he is afool. So it is by the exposure offolly'that it is
defeated; not by the seclusion offolly....
- Woodrow Wilson1
I. INTRODUCON: MEET WAYNE DICK
In April of 1986, Yale University hosted its fifth annual Gay and Lesbian
Awareness Days (GLAD) to increase the school community's awareness of the
campus' gay and lesbian population.2 Posters advertising GLAD's various events
were posted around campus.3 The week following GLAD, anonymous posters
appeared around campus as a parody of GLAD.4 The posters advertised the
fictitious BAD-Bestiality Awareness Days-and its fictional schedule of
activities.5 Although nothing in the posters was obscene under the legal
definition, nor did the text defame any specific individual, several members of the
Yale community were offended and began searching for the creator of the
anonymous posters.6 By questioning employees at local copy shops, it was
discovered that Wayne Dick, a sophomore from Florida, had copied the posters.7
Once the culprit's identity was known, Caroline Jackson, director of the
Afro-American Cultural Center, and Patrick Santana, a Yale senior, filed a
complaint with Patricia Pierce, associate dean and secretary of the Yale College
I Woodrow Wilson, Speech in the Institute of France in Paris (May 10, 1919) quoted in
RESPECrFULLY QUOTED 134 (Suzy Platt ed., 1993). Many people know Woodrow Wilson as
the twenty-eighth President of the United States, but before he was elected President, he was
Governor of New Jersey, and before he was elected Governor, he was a scholar and an
educator. See generally AUGUsT HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON BIOGRAPHY (1991). In 1902,
Wilson was named president of Princeton University. See id. In his inaugural address, Wilson
expressed the view that it was not the role of a university to prepare its students for a good job,
rather its purpose was to make them useful to society. JAN WILLEM SCHULTE NORDHOLT,
WOODROW WILSON: A LIFE FOR WORLD PEACE 55 (Herbert H. Rowen trans., 1991).
2 NAT HENrOFF, FREE SPEECH FORME--BUTNOT FOR THEE 118 (1992).
3 TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUs HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 50 (1998).
4 Id.
5 Some of the events advertised on the BAD posters were: ""PAN: the Goat, the God, the
Lover," a lecture by Professor Baaswell'; 'Bishop Bleatmore ... speaking on the IMPACT OF
HOMO ERECTUS ON THE ORIGIN OF NEW SPECIES, Blight Hall'; "'Lambda Lambda
Lambda--Yale's own Animal House!! announces their first BARNYARD RUSH-Y'all
Come!! all night at the Rockinghorse Club."' HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 119.
6 Seeid at 119.
7 Id. at 119-20.
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Executive Committee charging Wayne Dick8 with violating the university's code
of conduct 9 Specifically, Dick was charged with illegal harassment, which
banned "any act of harassment, intimidation, coercion or assault, or any other act
of violence against any member of the community, including sexual, racial or
ethnic harassment." 10 On May 2, 1986, Dick received a letter from the Yale
College Executive Committee informing him of the complaint and that two
members of the committee found sufficient grounds to warrant a hearing before
the full Executive Committee.1 1 Dick was required to prepare a written statement
for the hearing. 12
Wayne Dick developed his defense around provisions contained in the same
regulations that were used by Jackson and Santana to bring the initial charges. In
1975, C. Vann Woodward, a renowned professor of history at Yale, chaired a
committee that prepared a report; which was used to set the standard for freedom
of expression at Yale.13 The report, known as the Woodward Report, became part
of the undergraduate regulations, which were used to charge Dick with illegal
harassment. 14 Dick's defense focused on the following passage from the
Woodward Report:
If a university is a place for knowledge, it is also a special kind of small society.
Yet it is not primarily a fellowship, a club, a circle of friends, a replica of the civil
society outside it Without sacrificing its central purpose [to discover and disseminate
knowledge], it cannot make its primary and dominant value the fostering of
friendship, solidarity, harmony, civility or mutual respect .... It may sometimes be
necessary in a university for civility and mutual respect to be superseded by the need
to guarantee free expression....
8 Wayne Dick was a sophomore from a rural area of Florida. See SMELL, supra note 3, at
52. His father worked for a construction company and his mother was a secretary. Neither of
Wayne's parents graduated from college, and so Wayne was the first member of his family
with an opportunity to graduate from college. After Yale, Wayne planned on going to law
school. Id. at 120.
9 See SHIELL, supra note 3, at 50-51 (quoting the university's code of conduct).
10Id. at 51.
11 See HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 121. The letter also contained information pertaining to
the procedures for the upcoming hearing. The hearing would be closed and Dick was allowed
one faculty advisor, who was not permitted to participate directly in the hearing. There would
be no recorded vote, no explanation of the verdict, and the decision of the committee would be
final. SHELL., supra note 3, at 51. The Executive Committee was composed of both faculty and
students. HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 121.
12Id
13 HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 114.
14
.ad at 122.
12492000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Even when some members of the university community fail to meet their social
and ethical responsibilities, the paramount obligation of the university is to protect
that right to free expression.15
Dick wrote in his statement to the Executive Committee that, no matter how
distasteful the committee found the poster, "it [was] still protected" by the
Woodward Report.' 6 Dick concluded by writing: "'Only by ruling that the
15 The Report of the Committee on Free Expression at Yale [hereinafter Woodward
Report], in Yale University Undergraduate Regulations, quoted in HENTOFF, supra note 2,
at 122; see also ALEXANDERMEKLEIOHN, TEACHEROF FREEDOM 256 (1981).
The primary social fact which blocks and hinders the success of our experiment in self-
government is that our citizens are not educated for self-government We are terrified by ideas,
rather than challenged and stimulated by them. Our dominant mood is not the courage of people
who dare to think. It is the timidity of those who fear and hate whenever conventions are
questioned.
Id. An exchange between the two main antagonists in Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee's
play Inherit the Wind I think nicely demonstrates society's need for people who challenge the
status quo. The play, based on the trial that took place in Dayton, Kentucky in the 1920s, retells
the story of a school teacher who was prosecuted for teaching Darwinism in the local high
school in violation of state law. The exchange occurs as follows:
DRUMMOND. Listen to this: Genesis 4-16. "And Cain went out from the presence of the
Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod, on the East of Eden. And Cain knew his wifP' Where the
hell did she come from?
BRADY. Who?
DRUMMOND. Mrs. Cain. Cain's wife. If, "In the beginning" there were only Adam and Eve,
and Cain and Abel, where'd this extra woman spring from? Ever figure that out?
BRADY. (Cool.) No, sir. I will leave the agnostics to hunt for her. (Laughterfrom spectators.)
DRUMMOND. Never bothered you?
BRADY. Never bothered me.
DRUMMOND. Never tried to find out?
BRADY. No.
DRUMMOND. Figure somebody pulled off another creation over in the next county?
BRADY. The Bible satisfies me, it is enough.
DRUMMOND. It frightens me to imagine the state of learning in this world if everyone had
your driving curiosity....
JEROME LAWRENCE AND ROBERT E. LEE, INHMRT THE WIND 53 (1986). Summing up the play,
the authors wrote: "INHERIT THE WIND is not about the theory of evolution versus the literal
interpretation of the Bible. It assaults those who would constrict any human being's right to
think, to teach, to learn. Our major theme is 'the dignity of the human mind."' Id. at 83.
16 HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 123. It is important to note that Yale University is a private
institution and is not subject to the same constitutional barriers as its public counterparts. Private
schools are able to pass rules that would be deemed unconstitutional if the same rule were
passed at a state school. See Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression:
The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY LJ. 1351, 1378-
81 (1990) (stating that most courts have held that private universities are not state actors, thus
they are immune from the limitations imposed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments). But
see Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a Constitutional Difference, 1991
1250 [Vol. 61:1247
HATE SPEECH CODES
exercise of free speech is not harassment and finding that I am innocent will the
Executive Committee have justly interpreted its own rules and reaffirmed Yale's
commitment to free expression.' 17
Unfortunately for Wayne Dick, the Executive Committee chose not to
reaffirm the school's commitment to free expression. On May 13, the day after
Dick's two and one-half-hour hearing, the committee determined that Dick had
violated the harassment regulations. As a result, Dick was placed on two years
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (1991) (arguing that there is not a significant constitutional difference
between public and private schools). See also State v. Schmid, 84 NJ. 535, 567-69 (1980)
(holding that "in the absence of a reasonable regulatory scheme, Princeton University [a private
institution] did in fact violate defendant's State constitutional rights of expression").
In the Early 1990s, Henry Hyde, a representative from Illinois, introduced a bill that would
have applied the requirements of the First Amendment to private colleges and universities. The
bill died in the House of Representatives. See HATE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 129 n.3 (Milton
Heuman and Thomas W. Church eds., 1997).
Thus, Wayne Dick was unable to rely upon the First Amendment directly for help, but was
forced to build his defense around the Woodward Report, which happened to incorporate
principles derived from the First Amendment, into Yale's Disciplinary Code.
Although this note focuses on hate speech codes on public college campuses, I have
chosen to begin with the story of Wayne Dick because in my view, his speech is clearly
protected by the First Amendment. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(overturning the conviction of a man who wore a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Drafr'
because the Court stated the government may not punish speech it finds offensive simply
because it finds the speech offensive); Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972) (striking a city ordinance because the government may not select which issues are
worth discussing in public areas); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (striking a
permit requirement for conducting religious activities in a public park when some groups were
granted permits and other similarly situated groups were not). The question becomes what
makes a state college campus different from a public park or street comer? For a good
discussion of the differences between various areas of the college campus, see generally James
Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech,
38 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (1991) (describing different areas of a college campus and stating what
level of First Amendment protection the author believes each area deserves).
Even on the campuses of our nation's private universities, where the institution is not held
to the strictest constitutional standard, the tenets of the First Amendment are deeply ingrained
into the concept of what it means to be an academic community. See supra text accompanying
note 15; see also WAKE FOREST UNiVERsrIY, WAKE FOREST STUDENT HANDBOOK 9 (1997)
[hereinafter WAKE FOREST STUDENT HANDBOOK] (stating that the university subscribes to
principles that "promote[] a democratic spirit arising from open-mindedness and discourse")
(on file with author). There would seem to be serious tension, and perhaps a great deal of
hypocrisy, when a university declares in its "statement of principles" that it is devoted to the
principles of the First Amendment yet punishes someone like Wayne Dick for nothing more
than exercising the rights granted him in the school's handbook. See Siegel, supra, at 1388 ("A
private college or university which imposes upon its community a code that would not pass
constitutional muster at a public school risks being seen as disingenuous at best, and perhaps
even intellectually dishonest.").
17 HENfOFF, supra note 2, at 123.
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probation.18 Unwilling to simply accept his punishment, and in need of some
clarification on what was acceptable speech at Yale, 19 Wayne Dick wrote an
18 SH., supra note 3, at 51-52. At Yale, probation meant that the verdict would be part
of Dick's permanent record. If at any time during the next two years Dick committed a second
offense, he would be suspended or expelled. See HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 124.
It is interesting to note how times change. In 1976, Texas A&M University refused to
recognize a student organization called the Gay Student Services (GSS). Gay Student Servs. v.
Tex. A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir. 1984). The school refused recognition because
it perceived the group's goals to be inconsistent with those of the university. Id GSS's stated
goals were the following:
1) To provide a referral service for students desiring professional counseling including
psychological, religious, medical, and legal fields.
2) To provide to the TAMU community information conceming the structures and realities of
gay life.
3) To provide speakers to classes and organization who wish to know more about gay
lifestyles.
4) To provide a forum for the interchange of ideas and constructive solutions to gay people's
problems.
Id. The purported goals of the GSS were quite similar to the goals of Yale's GLAD in 1986.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Apparently at Texas A&M in 1976, Wayne Dick's
parody of GLAD's advertisements would have faced no disciplinary sanctions because the
university agreed with his viewpoint Unfortunately for Dick, his poster appeared at Yale ten
years later where his viewpoint did not meet with approval.
19 A clarification of what could and could not be expressed at Yale was very important to
Dick's future because a violation of his probation would result in a suspension or expulsion
from the school. For all intents and purposes, Dick's conviction permanently chilled his
expression because his speaking out on a controversial issue again could result in suspension.
With one strike already against him, Dick could hardly afford to be too expressive on any other
controversial matters. If the government or a school administration has the power to punish
speech then the chance of speech being chilled increases, and preventing the government from
chilling speech is one of the main purposes of the First Amendment. See Simon & Schuster v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) ("[ilt bears
repeating... that the govemment's ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises
the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace"); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (stating that
vigilant First Amendment enforcement protects against the "standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups").
The enforcement of a speech code by a university leads to an environment in which
students and faculty are afraid to discuss controversial issues. For example, after Douglas Harm
was expelled from Brown University, see infra note 30, a cloud of orthodoxy seemed to
descend upon the campus, as the following incidents demonstrate:
* Public speakers, both from within and without the university have had trouble completing
speeches because of hecklers' protests. During the semester in which Hann was expelled, an
El Salvadoran official received the "heckler's veto" at a lecture. Meetings conceming the reform
of the university's sexual assault policy were disrupted and brought to a close by BASH (Brown
Against Sexual Assault and Harassment) who opposed the university's perceived lax attitude
toward date rape. Upon failing to prevent a lecture by the controversial writer PJ. O'Rourke,
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appeal letter to Yale president, A. Bartlett Giamatti.2 0 The university's president
responded to Dick's appeal by stating that Dick had the right to express his
opinion on any topic, but nonetheless, the committee's decision would stand2 l
demonstrators packed the audience and disrupted the lecture by an angry mass exodus during
the speech.
0 Political Science Chair Nancy Rosenblum had to cajole her "Justice and Gender" class to
start any discussion regarding Affirmative Action, despite her assertion that she was sure that
there was an enormous range of opinions on the policy.
* Two weeks after President Gregorian addressed the assembled students on the green
regarding the racist and homophobic graffiti incident a Brown professor canceled the screening
of 'Birth of a Nation," after receiving criticism about the film's racist content.
& The Commencement issue of the Brown Daily Herald reported, "A professor of one of the
editors of this [issue], in a small, informal discussion with five people following a section,
confided that in class he had avoided discussing some research he had come across and some
unpopular conclusions he had come to about a controversial topic-the problem of inner-city
poverty. "It is a sensitive topic," he said, "and I don't want to get into it in front of a class of 150
Brown students."
HATE SPEECH ON CAMPUS, supra note 16, at 162-63.
20 In his letter to Yale President Giamatti, Dick wrote:
I have been told that my poster is not protected ... because it is worthless and offensive. I
have seen many posters that I thought were worthless and offensive, but I respect others' rights
to express their views.... I was bom and raised in a small town in Florida where the old
southem political philosophy and prejudices were commonly accepted. By and large, I accepted
these views without really considering them. When I came to Yale as a freshman, I found that
my views were held by a small minority and I soon had to justify them for the fist time .... In
defending my beliefs through conversation with various people, I realized that some of my
views were ill-considered. For those I have kept I now, at least, have a philosophical basis for
them. Of course, I can hardly claim to be all-wise after having just completed my sophomore
year but because of the free interchanging of ideas, I have grown .... To avoid heated
arguments and to avoid hard feelings, I have often kept silent, even when I had strong moral
objections to a point of view that was being stated. Recently, though, I decided to criticize an
event which was, until recently, considered morally repugnant My main reason for deciding to
state my opinion more publicly was that only one opinion on this issue was being heard .... I
ask that my sentence be overturned if the free expression regulation is in force or that my
sentence be reduced because of my ignorance of the special status of the debate on
homosexuality.... If my sentence is not overturned, please advise me as to other views that I
am also not allowed to criticize, so that I won't unknowingly violate my probation and the
standards of Yale University.
SHIELL, supra note 3, at 52.
21 SHELL, supra note 3, at 53. In the letter, Giamatti assured Dick that he had the right to
freedom of expression "on any issue" and that the university would protect that right "in the
future as it has in the past." Id The hypocrisy of Giamatti's statement is self-evident. See Siegel,
supra note 16, at 1390 ("A private university that... maintain[s] a restrictive speech policy
must face the chance that it will become known as hostile to free expression of thought").
Clearly, students at Yale at this time did not have the right to express their opinions on any
issue. Otherwise Wayne Dick would not have been punished for expressing his opinion. Unless
of course, any issue means any issue except homosexuality. This begs the question: Is there any
other exception to the general "any issue' rule under which Yale will decide to punish students
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Wayne Dick's situation looked rather bleak when Nat Hentoff, a free speech
journalist, heard about it and decided to get involved. At first, Hentoff ran into a
brick wall in the form of the Yale administration, but finally he talked with Guido
Calabresi, Dean of the Yale School of Law, who was familiar with the story and
felt the situation was "outrageous!" 22 After garnering the support of Dean
Calabresi, Hentoff contacted C. Vann Woodward, the Chairperson of the
committee that authored the Woodward Report and who remained a professor at
Yale.23 Professor Woodward informed the journalist that the Executive
Committee misused the report.24 Hentoff and Woodward began rallying the
national media around Wayne Dick, and articles critical of the Executive
Committee's decision appeared in The New York Times, The Village Voice, and
The Washington Post.25
During this period, Giamatti left Yale to become president of Major League
Baseball's National League and was replaced by Benno Schmidt.26 President
Schmidt, in his inaugural address, announced his stand on the topic of free
expression when he stated: 'There is no speech so horrendous in content that it
does not in principle serve our purposes."27 President Schmidt then encouraged
Wayne Dick to ask the Executive Committee for a new hearing, which Dick
decided to do.28 In a press release, the Executive Committee announced that it
had voted to reverse its earlier decision to discipline Wayne Dick adding that the
post facto? This was a very important issue to Wayne Dick who was already on probation
because another violation could have meant expulsion. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
2 2 HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 127. Calabresi, now a federal circuit court judge, continued:
"It would have been perfectly appropriate for the faculty and the administrators to say that the
flyer was disgraceful and disgusting and that he should be ashamed of himself. But what he did
was not in any way punishable. .." Id
23 See id. at 128.
24 Id. Woodward also stated, "The Woodward Report does not guarantee that the speech
has to be acceptable or pleasant or even correct. It simply guarantees the right to all to exercise
their speech. Mr. Dick, it seems to me, was doing just that." Id at 128-29.25 See id. at 129-30 (discussing the various news reports and editorials that were published
in the national media). One major problem with regulating offensive speech is that people take
up the speaker's cause-not because they agree with the message, but because they believe in
his right to say it Instead of a few fliers being posted around New Haven, Connecticut, for a
few days, Wayne Dick's exploits received national attention. Dick was given a microphone and
pulpit to spread his opinions across the entire country. See JAMEs WEiNsTEmiN, HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATrACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCRINE 150-53 (1999)
(suggesting that experience both at home and abroad demonstrates that prosecutions of racist
speech allows the racist speech to be more widely disseminated than it would have been
without the prosecution).
26 See SHIELL, supra note 3, at 53.
27 HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 129.
28 Id.
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decision to overturn Dick's conviction had nothing to do with the negative
publicity the committee had received from the national media.29
Expressions similar to those made by Wayne Dick can be found on almost
any college campus in the country,30 and codes similar to Yale's, known
generically as "campus hate speech codes," can be found on an increasing
number of campuses as well.31 The moral, ethical, and constitutional validity of
these codes has been hotly debated, generating numerous battles over the
constitutionality of campus speech codes in our nation's courts.3 2
Whether it is a wise practice to institute hate speech codes becomes a moot
point if the drafters of such codes are unable to create a code that is deemed
constitutional. This note will briefly evaluate the merits of these codes; however,
the focus will be on why these provisions have failed in the past and what factors
drafters should consider in the future.
29Id. at 129-30.
3 0 See, e.g., SHIELL, supra note 3, at 17 (listing various examples of hateful speech on
college campuses); Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L2. 431, 431-33 (1990) (beginning his article with a "Newsreel" of
racist incidents on college campuses around the country). In November of 1990, Douglas A.
Hann, ajunior at Brown University in Providence, R.I., was expelled from the school primarily
for making racist, sexist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic statements. See HATE SPEECH ON
CAMPUS, supra note 16, at 149-69. There are a number of similarities between Douglas Harm's
situation at Brown and the Wayne Dick odyssey four years earlier at Yale.
3 1 See, e.g., Jearme M. Craddock, Constitutional Law-"Words that Injure; Laws
that Silence:" Campus Hate Speech Codes and the Threat to American Education,
22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1047, 1051-55 (discussing the rise of hate speech codes on college
campuses and differentiating between explicit and implicit codes-both of which limit
expression on campus). See SHIELL, supra note 3, at 49 (stating that twenty-eight percent of
American universities "ban advocacy of offensive or outrageous viewpoint[s]"); see also
Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers on Campus: Liberties, Limitations and Common
Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 39, 75 n.177 (1999) (noting that one observer has
determined that approximately seven hundred colleges and universities had enacted speech
codes by 1995).
Explicit speech codes are simply those regulations that do not even attempt to hide their
purpose. The code was adopted for one purpose-to punish speech the university finds
offensive. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (descibing the University of
Michigan's explicit speech code). In contrast, implicit speech codes are hidden within a
university's code of conduct and can be pulled out by a college administrator at any time to
punish speech found to be offensive. See, eg., WAKE FOREST STUDENT HANDBOOK, supra note
16, at 48 ("18. Any unauthorized activity on University property which affects the University's
pursuit of its mission is prohibited:") (on file with author). Implicit speech codes may be more
dangerous than explicit codes because at least explicit codes provide the student with some
forewarning of what conduct is punishable. After all, what actually constitutes unauthorized
activity?
3 2 Compare HENTOFF, supra note 2 (opposing vehemently the adoption of speech codes)
with CATHARiNE A. MACKiNNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (putting forth the proposition that
hateful speech is hurtful and should be punished).
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Part II of this note will address what I call Phase I of the hate speech code
debate. Phase I discusses the original justification for campus speech codes,
focusing primarily on the constitutional justifications offered by proponents of
such codes. Part II also examines the various court cases analyzing campus
speech regulations. For the most part, courts refused to accept the proponents'
constitutional justifications for the college speech codes, and instead struck down
the codes as violating the First Amendment. Before Phase I came to an end the
Supreme Court joined the debate, making it even more difficult to design a
speech code that would withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Part III of this note proposes a potentially constitutional speech code. This
regulation is based on elements taken from the Supreme Court's decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Distict33 and Title VII's
workplace harassment guidelines. 34 One of the major problems courts had with
campus hate speech codes in Phase I was that the proponents of the codes would
stretch their justifications for the codes too far, so that the code would limit more
speech than was actually justified. The Tinker-Title VII theory attempts to take
only what is needed from each prong to justify a speech code. The Tinker-Title
VII theory provides proponents of speech codes with a constitutionally accepted
justification and framework for limiting hateful speech on college campuses. Part
E1 concludes by bringing Wayne Dick back into the picture and revisiting his
situation under the Tinker-Title VII theory.
II. PHASE I OF THE HATE SPEECH CODE DEBATE
During the 1960s, college campuses were a hotbed for violent demonstrations
including protests concerning the Vietnam Conflict and the denial of civil rights
to millions of African-Americans. 35 Growing out of the aftermath of the
McCarthy paranoia, there was a serious commitment to protecting free expression
at the nation's universities.36 In the 1980s, there was a "rise in the number of
33 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3 4 See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
35 See Richard A. Glenn & Otis H. Stephens, Campus Hate Speech and Equal Protection:
Competing Constitutional Values, 6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 349,354 (1997).
3 6 In a series of cases stretching from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Supreme Court expressed
the importance of free expression in higher education. In a 1957 case the Court upheld a
professor's right to express politically unpopular opinions when it stated, 'Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960),
the Court declared, "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools." This idea was reaffirmed by the Court when the
State University of New York at Buffalo attempted to condition professors' employment on
their denial of affiliation with the Communist Party. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 591-92, 603 (1967) (stating that academic freedom is
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verbal, physical and political attacks on members of minority groups in the
United States."37 In response to this rise in hate crimes, many universities passed
hate speech codes in order to "achieve [an] equality for traditionally subordinated
groups in the marketplace of ideas."38 The passage of speech codes on college
campuses also paralleled the international community's response to the rise of
hate crimes around the world.39 Thus, although there has been a strong
commitment to academic freedom at American universities4 0 many college
administrations have implicitly placed the right to equality above the right to free
expression by passing speech codes to protect minority students from hateful
speech.41
"a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom"). A few years later the Court held that the need to maintain order
on a college campus does not mean that "First Amendment protections should apply with less
force... than in the community at large.' Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). Finally,
the Court stated that a university could not limit speech simply because of the offensive nature
of the speech. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam) ("[Tihe mere
dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus
may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency."').
37 Craddock, supra note 31, at 1050. See also Glenn & Stephens, supra note 35, at 352-53
(highlighting the pattems of hate crimes in the United States in the 1990s); H.R. REP. No. 103-
244, at 3 (1993) (citing studies that show reported incidents of hate crimes in the early 1990s
reached an all time high).
38 Craddock, supra note 31, at 1048.
39 
"The United States stands virtually alone in thinking that hate speech ought to be
legal" SHIELL, supra note 3, at 32. Most members of the international community have adopted
article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212. In addition,
many countries have adopted their own speech regulations, which place the right to equality
over the right to free expression. Id However, other scholars point out that there is no evidence
from these countries that their censorship has had an effect on racist attitudes. Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 554 (1990).
Additionally, no persuasive psychological evidence exists that shows punishment of hateful
speech helps to change individuals' attitudes. Id
40 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
4 1 See Patricia Hodulik, Racist Speech on Campus, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1433, 1433 (1991)
("The increasing frequency of racist speech and other forms of discriminatory conduct on
college campuses has led many colleges and universities to adopt or to consider adopting
student conduct rules prohibiting such behavior.").
College administrators do not appear to be the only Americans prepared to limit First
Amendment protections. A recent survey turned up some remarkable results, including the
following: 67% of respondents said that public remarks offensive to racial groups should not be
allowed, 36% of respondents would support a ban on racist speech, and 31% of respondents
said a group should not be allowed to protest if others in the community are offended by the
protestors' cause. Ken Paulson, Answers suggest we are a nation that loses sight offundamental
freedoms, TIE NEws-HERALD, July 2, 2000, at BI & B6 (on file with author).
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A. Hate Speech Codes Justified
Commentators have proposed several justifications for the passage of hate
speech regulations. One of the most commonly proposed justifications is that hate
speech inflicts psychological, physical, and pecuniary harm on individual
victims.42 Moreover, proponents of speech codes argue that regulating speech not
only protects minorities from this harm, but also exemplifies a university's
disapproval of hateful speech and its commitment to tolerance and diversity. 43
Proponents of speech codes also focus on the fact that the First Amendment is a
tool for discovering the truth, and therefore, speech that does not contribute to the
discovery of the truth does not deserve First Amendment protection 44 Others
have argued that racist or sexist speech is "qualitatively and definitively" worse
than other forms of unpopular speech, and thus deserves less protection 45
Whatever the philosophical justification for campus speech regulations, a
university must find a constitutional justification to support the passage of such a
restriction. The next section of Part II will address the original constitutional
justifications put forth by proponents of speech codes to establish their
constitutional validity.
42 See SHIELL, supra note 3, at 31-33 (discussing Mar Matsuda and Richard Delgado's
theories about the effects of hate speech on minorities). Mai Matsuda and Richard Delgado cite
studies that show hate speech causes feelings of humiliation and isolation, mental illness, and
can result in a lack of participation in activities. Id; see generally Mar Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320 (1989)
(suggesting imposing administrative sanctions against those who use racist speech in public);
see also Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 629, 640 n.50 (1985) (discussing the psychological trauma residents of
Skokie, Illinois, experienced when confronted with the possibility of having members of the
Nazi party walk down their city's streets).
Hentoff criticizes the approach taken by Matsuda and Delgado because he believes it leads
to a mindset of victimization, rather than one of empowerment. See HENTOFF, supra note 2, at
217-18. Another writer argued that college speech codes actually hurt the students they were
meant to protect because the codes can give "a false sense of security unavailable outside the
college environment." William Shaun Alexander, Note, Regulating Speech on Campus: A Plea
for Tolerance, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1349, 1375 (1990). If one of the major purposes of
college is to prepare students for the "real world," one could ask Is sheltering them from it the
best teaching strategy?
43 Hodulik, supra note 41, at 1437 (citing the Minutes of the Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System from March, April, and June 1989).
44 One scholar states that since racist or sexist epithets do not try to inform or convince the
listener of the speaker's point of view, they are not a tool for discovering the truth. Craddock,
supra note 31, at 1057. It is possible, however, to be totally unpersuaded by an idea and still
learn from the idea. A person can learn a great deal about their own viewpoints by listening to
the unpersuasive statements of someone with whom they disagree.
45 Judge Danny J. Boggs, Reining in Judges: The Case of Hate Speech, 52 SMU L. REV.
271,275-76 (1999).
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B. Constitutional Justifications for Speech Codes
If the only factor to consider were the effectiveness of speech codes on the
elimination of speech that has a demonstrated negative impact on minorities, the
debate surrounding college speech codes would not be so heated 4 6 Campus
speech regulations, however, also implicate First Amendment protections. Thus,
proponents of these codes have attempted to develop justifications based upon
First Amendmentjurisprudence 47
1. The Group Libel/Defamation Model
This model revolves around the Supreme Court's ruling in Beauharnais v.
Illinois,48 which upheld a state statute making it unlawful to use various mediums
in a way that portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a
class of citizens of any race, color, creed, or religion 49 The Illinois law was
designed to "cool the heated rhetoric of white nationalist supremacists... [and]
was rarely enforced."50 Although the Illinois law and all other state laws banning
group libel were eventually repealed, one case did make it to the Supreme Court.
This case, Beauharnais, has never been overturned, and thus is technically the
law of the land.51
Those who favor speech regulations have used the Beauharnais decision to
constitutionally justify the limitation on speech imposed by these codes.52 The
reasoning behind this model is quite simple.53 Proponents argue that because the
First Amendment, according to the Beauharnais decision, does not protect group
4 6 See SHELL, supra note 3, at 39.
471dt at 39--40.
48 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
49 Id. at 266.
50 SHIELL, supra note 3, at 42.
51 See id at 43. The Beauharnais case was a 5-4 decision issued at an early point in the
Supreme Court's development of First Amendment protections, and is considered by many no
longer to be good law. Strossen, supra note 39, at 518. The soundness of Beauharnais is even
more questionable if considered in light of more recent First Amendment decisions "on related
issues, notably its holdings that strictly limit individual defamation actions so as not to chill free
speech" Id.
52 See, e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First
Amendment, 17 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 11 (1985); Rhonda G. Hartman, Revitalizing
Group Defamation as a Remedyfor Hate Speech on Campus, 71 OR. L. REv. 855 (1992).
53 In addition to Beauharnais's weak precedential value, see supra note 51 and
accompanying text, group libel as a justification for speech codes is criticized because it was
often used as a weapon to chill the speech of minority groups. Strossen, supra note 39, at 520.
Moreover, some argue that members of minority groups would not be helped by a policy that
requires the maker of the allegedly libelous statement to defend himself by demonstrating it was
made with a good faith belief in its truth. Id. at 519.
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libel and some hate speech constitutes group libel, universities may pass
regulations punishing group libel.54 Proponents of group libel-based speech codes
note that the Supreme Court has narrowed, but never overruled Beauharnais,
while simultaneously upholding several other restrictions on speech such as
obscenity, plagiarism, remarks made to captive audiences, and fraud.55
2. The University Mission Model
The University Mission Model rests upon the Post-Civil War
Amendments--the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments-because
of their guarantees of equal opportunity.56 Proponents contend that hateful speech
denies targets of such speech their Fourteenth Amendment right of equal access
to educational facilities and, therefore, the state has a duty to restrict the
majority's ability to use hate speech.57 Proponents of this view believe that
universities have a special obligation to ensure that they provide non-hostile
environments for their minority students.58 Many American universities hold
themselves out to be "havens of diversity," and thus have an obligation to make
their campuses suitable for diversity.59 Some scholars argue that the negative
impact of hate speech deprives minorities of the chance to participate in the
academic environment provided by universities to non-minorities, who are not
exposed to hate speech.60
Proponents of the University Mission Model criticize the marketplace of
ideas metaphor61 because inequalities of power can silence minorities, keeping
54 SHIMLL, supra note 3, at 43.
55 Id. at 44-45.
5 6 See id at 46.
57 See Craddock, supra note 31, at 1056-57.
58 Cf id.
5 9 Glenn & Stephens, supra note 35, at 350.
60 See Strossen, supra note 39, at 505.
61 Oliver Wendell Holmes laid out the marketplace of ideas metaphor in his dissenting
opinion inAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919):
[When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
Id. at 630. The marketplace theory teaches that people should not fear speech. According to this
theory, the best response to speech with which you disagree is not to restrict the speaker's
ability to speak, but to reply with your own ideas. In this way, you will ensure that the view
with which you disagree is rejected by the marketplace. But see infra note 63 and
accompanying text (citing arguments that the marketplace metaphor does not work when
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those without power out of the marketplace.62 They argue that because everyone
in society is not dedicated to the pursuit of truth, other factors can cause the
marketplace to be used for purposes not related to uncovering the lruth.63
applied to hate speech). However, practice shows that the marketplace theory can work with
hate speech. In 1991, at Arizona State University, four African-American women observed a
poster on a dorm room door entitled, "Simplified Form of a Job Application. Form for Minority
Applicants." Weinstein, supra note 16, at 234 n.202. "The mock application contained such
questions as 'source of income: 1) theft, 2) welfare, 3) unemployment' and 'number of
legitimate children (if any)."' Id. The women spoke with the man on whose door the poster was
hung and asked him to take it down, which he agreed to do. Id. Instead of bringing charges
against the occupants of the dorm room, the four women organized an open meeting in the
men's residence hall to discuss the incident and the problem of racism in general. Id. Over the
next several days, students contributed to the marketplace of ideas by condemning the poster
and protesting against racist attitudes on campus. Id. A few days later, without any coercion
from the university (in fact, the university, though condemning the poster, supported the
students' right to espouse racist ideas), the men made a public apology for posting the sign. Id.;
see also Nat Hentoff, The Right Thing atASU, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at A19.
Comparing what happened at Arizona State to Wayne Dick's situation at Yale, the
question becomes which method is more effective in dealing with hate speech. The Yale
approach made Wayne Dick a First Amendment martyr, and the fact that his sign was offensive
was lost on many. Wayne Dick never sincerely apologized for his BAD posters and never was
made to learn that he had hurt people. Rather, Dick must have felt that he was being attacked,
thus further ingraining the hateful ideas within him. In contrast, the Arizona State approach not
only empowered minority students, but also-through the exercise of the First Amendment-
taught the students who hung the poster that they had hurt others with their offensive speech. If
these students felt like they were being attacked for expressing a particular viewpoint, this
feeling derived from the response of their fellow students who made up the community within
which they lived.
Furthermore, the marketplace seems to be working because a message of equality is
becoming the orthodoxy and racist speech is currently considered dissident speech. See
WEINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 101 (explaining Weinstein's opinion on "Equality as Orthodoxy"
and listing several incidents that support his theory). Weinstein offers the following "thought
experiment" for those who doubt his theory: 'Imagine a candidate for CEO of a large public
corporation who during the interview proclaims his belief in the genetic inferiority of black
people." Id. Weinstein continues to the conclusion that "[i]t is inconceivable that the candidate
would be hired." Id.
62 See SHMELL, supra note 3, at 46.
63 The marketplace image creates the idea that society is like a debate club, where group
discussion among club members will lead to the correct answer. Society is not a debate club
because a debate club has credentialed participants with obligations of professional courtesy,
common frames of reference, knowledge of prior arguments and precedents, and a system for
removing unsuccessful debaters from the discussion. See Willmoore Kendall, The "Open
Society" and Its Fallacies, 54 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 972, 977 (1960); see also Lawrence, supra
note 30, at 467-68 (claiming that the marketplace does not work because racism is irrational
and often unconscious). But see WEINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 104-06 (stating that dialogue is
one of the main forces in shifting societal attitudes and citing the abolition movement as an
example of the effectiveness of the marketplace over time).
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Permitting hate speech can reduce the flow of ideas in the marketplace because
"the threats implicit in hate speech silence many minorities." 64 Particularly, Cass
Sunstein, a respected First Amendment scholar, argues that college campuses are
not like city streets in that universities regularly control the speech of faculty and
students.65 Therefore, narrowly tailored hate speech codes should help to
maintain a non-hostile environment for minorities while at the same time posing
little threat to the marketplace of ideasf 6
3. Fighting Words Model
The Fighting Words Model derives from the Supreme Court's holding in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,67 which upheld a state statute prohibiting the
making of "any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person." 68
Chaplinsky was proselytizing in a small town in New Hampshire until he had a
confrontation with the local authorities.69 Apparently, during the conversation
between Chaplinsky and the officer, Chaplinsky called the officer a "God-
damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist' and the whole town government a
bunch of "Fascists."70 Chaplinsky was arrested, and the Supreme Court upheld
his conviction by creating the fighting words doctrine.71 As originally enunciated
Weinstein argues that social change takes time and should not be expected to happen
overnight, and that social change will not happen without affording protection to dissident
speech. Id. at 105. In the early 1830s, the abolitionist movement was considered fanatical in the
North, but Northern politicians refused to submit to Southern demands to censor such speech.
Id. A little more than a generation later the abolitionists' message had become the orthodoxy in
the North and the moral justification for the North's refusal to allow secession. Id. Weinstein
sums up the need to preserve the marketplace by writing:
For it has never been a tenet of free speech that unrestrained public discourse will quickly
lead to social progress or even that it will in every instance lead directly to enlightened social
policy. Rather, the claim is that, on the whole and over time, unfettered public discussion will
lead to a fairer and more just society than will government control of public discourse.
Id. at 105-06.
64 SHIELL, supra note 3, at 46.
65 See CAss R. SUNsTIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 199-200
(1993) (stating that universities often place limits on topics that can be discussed in the
classroom and require civility in classroom discussions; and that grading and tenure decisions
are often based on viewpoint biases of the faculty and administration).
66 See id
67 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
68 Id at 569.
69.Id at 570.
70 Id. at 569.
71 See id at 573. According to Shiell's interpretation of the Court's decision, "Chaplinsky
was not protected by the First Amendment because his words did not contribute to the
1262 [Vol. 61:1247
HATE SPEECH CODES
by the Court, fighting words were "those [words] which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."72 Thus,
originally, there were two types of fighting words: (1) those which by their very
utterance inflict injury and (2) those which tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace.7 3
Since 1942, the Supreme Court has limited the applicability of the fighting
words doctrine originally employed in Chaplinsky.74 In fact, since the Court
announced its decision in Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has overturned every
single fighting words conviction that it has reviewed.75 In Gooding v. Wilson,76 as
well as every other decision on the subject since Chaplinsky, the Court
disregarded the first category of fighting words announced in Chaplinsky.77
Currently, a regulation restricting fighting words may be applied constitutionally
only if the prohibited speech will almost certainly lead to immediate violence.78
The logic behind hate speech codes based on the fighting words doctrine is
similar to the reasoning of the group libel model. Proponents say that because the
First Amendment does not protect fighting words and because some campus hate
speech contains fighting words, university speech regulations prohibiting fighting
words are constitutional.79
discussion of public issues but rather contributed to public disorder because they were likely to
cause the average person to fight." SHERL, supra note 3, at 40-41.
72 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
73 Although the Court announced two types of fighting words, the Court's decision in
Chaplinsky rested solely on the second type: those that tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. Id at 573. Thus, the first category of fighting words was created in the dicta of the
Court's opinion. Note that the fighting words doctrine was used in Chaplinsky to restrict the
speech of a member of a minority group-a Jehovah's Witness-thus, like group libel, the
fighting words doctrine can be used to suppress the speech of those whom universities seek to
protect by implementing speech regulations. See also infra note 197 (stating that hate crime
statutes are also applied against those they were supposedly designed to protect).
74 Strossen, supra note 39, at 508-09 (discussing how the Court has narrowed the fighting
words doctrine).
75 See id at 510 n.127 (listing several Supreme Court decisions that have overturned
convictions based upon fighting words statutes).
76 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
77 See id at 523 (eliminating from the definition of fighting words those words that inflict
injury by their very utterance).
78 Strossen, supra note 39, at 509. Because of the limitations of the fighting words
doctrine, the University of Texas system expressly refused to use this model to create a campus
regulation. Id at 513.
79 SHIELL, supra note 3, at 41.
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C. The Constitutional Justifications for Hate Speech Codes are Tested in
Court
With the two sides of the hate speech code debate believing so strongly in
their viewpoints, it was only a matter of time before the issue wound up in the
federal court system. The following section will discuss how the courts have
addressed the issue of campus hate speech regulations.
1. Doe v. University of Michigan
In what has become one of the most important First Amendment decisions in
recent decades,80 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, in Doe v. University ofMichigan,81 struck down a hate speech code as
an impermissible infringement upon the First Amendment.82 The University of
Michigan decision represents the first time a federal court considered the
constitutionality of a university's hate speech code. The fact that the court
80 Although some proponents of hate speech codes originally discounted the University of
Michigan decision as simply a court striking down a poorly written speech regulation, time and
similar decisions by other federal courts demonstrate that this decision should not have been
ignored. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 30, at 477 n.161:
I believe that there is an element of unconscious collusion in the inability of universities, some
with top notch legal staffs and fine law schools, to draft narrow, carefully crafted regulations.
For example, it is difficult to believe that anyone at the University of Michigan Law School was
consulted in drafting the regulation that was struck down at that university. It is almost as if
university administrators purposefully wrote an unconstitutional regulation so they could say to
black students, "We tried but the courts just won't let us."
Id. (citations oritted). See generally Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious
racism and its effects on society).
Robert Sedler, the attorney who argued against the University of Michigan's regulation,
believed University of Michigan would be a landmark decision with a tremendous effect on
future speech codes. Robert A. Sedler, Doe v. University of Michigan and Campus Bans on
"'Racist Speech" The View From Within, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1325, 1327-28 (1990). Sedler
noted that the University of Michigan did not hastily or carelessly throw together its speech
code. Rather the code went through several drafts and was carefully worded in an attempt to
achieve its objective and also be deemed constitutional. Id; see also Siegel, supra note 16, at
1390-91 (citing Tufts University as an example of a university that decided to repeal its speech
code after the University ofMichigan decision was handed down).
81 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
82 Id. at 868 ("While the Court is sympathetic to the university's obligation to ensure equal
educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the expense of free
speech.").
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invalidated the code sent a strong message that these codes will be highly
scrutinized for constitutional infirmities. s3
In response to an increasing number of incidents of racism on campus, and
after the threat of a class action suit by a student group against the university for
failing to maintain or create a non-racist atmosphere on campus, the University of
Michigan enacted a policy regulating hate speech on campus.84 The university's
policy identified different areas of the campus and made the level of speech
tolerated dependent upon where on campus the speech occurred.85 For example,
the regulation applied to "educational and academic centers," and in these areas
students were subject to discipline for verbal behavior that "stigmatizes or
victimizes an individual on the basis of race" and "[c]reates an intimidating,
hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or
participation in University sponsored... activities."86 The university's Office of
Affirmative Action issued an interpretive guide to provide the students with
guidance on what would constitute sanctionable conduct.87
83 In his conclusion, District Judge Cohn quoted from the University of Michigan's own
policy to show that speech codes are inconsistent with the principle of free expression: "In all
instances, the university authorities should act with maximum constraint, even in the face of
obvious bad taste or provocation. The belief that some opinion is pernicious, false, or in any
other way detestable cannot be grounds for its suppression." Id A university having such a
policy, while at the same time attempting to punish speech it finds offensive, is as hypocritical
as the letter Wayne Dick received from Giamatti. See supra note 21. Apparently, maximum
constraint at the University of Michigan did not mean much.
84 See Univ. ofMich., 721 F. Supp. at 854-56 (describing the situation at the University of
Michigan that led to the creation of the school's speech code).
85 Id. at 856. The University of Michigan's plan was similar to the argument made by
James Weinstein in his article A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate
Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (1991). It is interesting that nowhere in the article does the
author mention the University ofMichigan decision, which, though not identical to the author's
proposal, was at the very least similar. This could support Robert Sedler's theory that
proponents of hate speech codes would at least initially disregard the Doe decision. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
86 See Univ. ofMih., 721 F. Supp. at 856.
87The guide was entitled "What Students Should Know about Discrimination and
Discriminatory Harassment by Students in the University Environment." The guide was
purported to be authoritative. Some of the sanctionable conduct listed in the guide included:
A flyer containing racist threats distributed in a residence hall. Racist graffiti written on the door
of an Asian student's study carrel. A male student makes remarks in class like "Women just
aren't as good in this field as men," thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere for female
classmates. Students in a residence hall have a floor party and invite everyone on their floor
except one person because they think she might be a lesbian.
Id at 858. In addition, the guide provided a helpful section for determining if you in fact are a
harasser entitled "You are a harasser when ...."
You exclude someone from a study group because that person is of a different race, sex, or
ethnic origin than you are. You telljokes about gay men and lesbians. Your student organization
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John Doe was a graduate student studying biopsychology at the University of
Michigan.88 Doe worked with theories examining biological differences between
the sexes and races and feared that some students might find his work sexist or
racist.89 Because of the university's speech policy and its sanctions, Doe was
apprehensive about discussing his theories. 90 Doe challenged the university's
speech code, not because he had been 3prosecuted under it, but rather, he wanted it
struck down to avoid being prosecuted under the code.91 Doe challenged the
policy saying that it had infringed upon his right to "freely and openly" discuss
his theories and because the speech code was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.92
sponsors entertainment that includes a comedian who slurs Hispanics. You display a
confederate flag on the door of your room in a residence hall. You laugh at a joke about
someone in your class who stutters.
Id.
Apparently, this guide was withdrawn sometime during the winter of 1989 because "the
information in it was not accurate," but this withdrawal was never announced publicly. Id at
857-58. Although this guide was eventually withdrawn, the university obviously believed there
was nothing wrong with punishing students for laughing at a joke. The guide highlights one of
the major problems with hate speech codes in that the only speech that is punished by the codes
is the speech that the group in power finds offensive. The problem is that the Supreme Court
has long held that the State does not possess the power to outlaw certain speech based solely on
content. See, e.g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (stating that the First Amendment must be protected with great vigilance).
The university's guide may have contained some absurd passages, but the idea of giving
students warning as to what types of speech would be sanctionable is a noble idea. Speech
codes have been criticized for being too vague because often individuals do not know that their
speech is sanctionable until they are punished. See Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 866-67
(stating that the Michigan code was unclear on exactly what speech would be punishable);
Strossen, supra note 39, at 529 ("Any anti-hate speech rule entails some vagueness, due to the
inherent imprecision of key words and concepts common to all such proposed rules."). The
university's guide attempted to wam the students about what speech would be sanctioned, thus
reducing the post facto element of the speech code.
88 Univ. ofMich., 721 F. Supp. at 858.
89 Id.
90 d
91 SHIELL, supra note 3, at 75. See Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 859 ("It is well settled
that an individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a penal statute if he or she
can demonstrate a realistic and credible threat of enforcement. ... [This] threat of enforcement
must be specific and direct and against a particular party.") (citations omitted). Evidently, Doe
did not want to risk falling prey to the same fate that befell Wayne Dick. By taking the
university to court, Doe, unlike Dick, did not give the University of Michigan a chance to
punish him post facto for speech it found offensive.
92 Uni. ofMich., 721 F. Supp. at 858.
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District Judge Cohn began his opinion by quoting a passage from Lee
Bollinger's Tolerant Society, highlighting the fact that judges have little leeway in
dealing with regulations restricting protected speech.93 Apparently, no matter
how despicable Judge Cohn felt hate speech was, if the university's speech code
restricted protected speech, he would have little choice but to strike the regulation
down. Before deciding that the regulation was unconstitutional, the court looked
at the plain language of the regulation,94 the legislative history of the regulation,95
and the university's practice of enforcing the regulation against protected
speech.96
Looking more closely at the court's opinion, the judge began by describing
several "categories of conduct' where a university may impose sanctions without
violating the First Amendment.97 Next, the court discussed examples of speech
the university could not sanction.98 Specifically, the court wrote that the
university could not prohibit speech "because it disagreed with [the] ideas or [the]
messages sought to be conveyed," nor because the speech "was found to be
offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of people."9 9 The court also noted
93 From the very beginning of the opinion, proponents of the university's speech code had
to be disheartened because the first passage of the opinion went as follows:
Making stock of the legal system's own limitations, we must realize that judges, being human,
will not only make mistakes but will sometimes succumb to the pressures exerted by the
government to allow restraints [on speech] that ought not to be allowed. To guard against these
possibilities we must give judges as little room to maneuver as possible and, again, extend the
boundary of the realm of protected speech into the hinterlands of speech in order to minimize
the potential harm from judicial miscalculations and misdeeds.
Id. at 853 (quoting LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERAN'4T SoCIETY 78 (1986)).
94 Id. at 859 (discussing how the words "stigmatize" and "victimize" are not self-defining
and rely upon "some exogenous value system" for enforcement).
95 Id. at 859-60 (discussing how the university's policy was designed to sanction the
speech which "seriously offend[ed] many individuals").
9 6 Id. at 861 (explaining that in the year the policy was in effect it was used at least three
times against students who were disciplined for controversial comments made in a classroom or
research setting simply because the comments offended others).
97 Among the categories of conduct listed were sexual harassment, vandalism and
property damage for the purpose of intimidation, fighting words, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, incitement of immediate lawless action, obscenity, and libel and slander. Id
at 861-63.
98 Id at 863.
99 Id. The court cited to several cases for these principles, including the Texas flag burning
case, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the Supreme Court wrote: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein." Id at 642. Judge Cohn's decision in many ways
parallels the conclusions of the Woodward Report that Wayne Dick used as the focal point of
his defense to Yale's offensive speech charges. 'It may sometimes be necessary in a university
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that "[t]hese principles acquire a special significance in the university setting,
where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the
institution's educational mission." 1°° Judge Cohn wrote that it was with these
principles in mind that he would analyze the university's policy to determine if
the scope of the regulation sanctioned speech "otherwise protected by the First
Amendment." 01
Although the university argued that the policy did not apply to protected
speech, the court found that the policy was, in fact, applied on several occasions
to speech protected by the First Amendment. 102 The court found three instances
where the university either disciplined or threatened to discipline students for
statements made in the course of an academic discussion.103 One of these
incidents involved a remark made during a group discussion in a difficult upper-
level dentistry class.104 The group was formed for the purpose of informally
discussing anticipated problems the class might pose for its students.10 5 During
the discussion, one student stated that "he had heard that minorities had a difficult
time in the course and that he had heard that they were not treated fairly."'0 6 The
professor filed charges against the student complaining that the statement was
unfair and could hurt her chances of gaining tenure. 107 The court concluded its
analysis of the overbreadth argument by stating that "[t]he manner in which these
for civility and mutual respect to be superseded by the need to guarantee free expression."
Woodward Report, supra note 15; see also supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. This
similarity is significant because Yale University is a private school, and thus not required to
adhere to the principles of the First Amendment, yet through the Woodward Report, First
Amendment principles were still incorporated into the school's disciplinary code. See supra
note 16 (discussing the difference between public and private schools in relation to the First
Amendment).
100 Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 863; see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 253
(discussing the importance of having a place for active discussion among the members of our
self-goveming society).
Additionally, writing in dissent in 1969 a Sixth Circuit Judge wrote that speech on a
college campus must be considerably more disruptive than speech in a high school to justify a
limitation. See Norton v. Discipline Comm. of East Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195, 210-11
(6th Cir. 1969) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). In this case, students were suspended from college
for passing out literature that called upon students to stand up for their rights. Id. at 196-97.
Although the majority of the Sixth Circuit upheld this suspension in 1969, 1 question if the court
today would reach the same conclusion, or instead adopt the thinking of Judge Celebrezze.
101 Univ. ofMich., 721 F. Supp. at 863-64.
102 See id at 866.
103 See id. at 865-66 (describing three instances where the university brought charges
against a student for making statements during academic discussions that fell well within the
protections of the First Amendment).
104 Id. at 866.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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three complaints were handled demonstrated that the University considered
serious comments made in the context of classroom discussion to be sanctionable
under the Policy... [and that the] University could not seriously argue that the
policy was never interpreted to reach protected conduct."10 8 Therefore, the court
found the university's regulation to be "overbroad both on its face and as
applied."'109
The court concluded its analysis of the university's policy by addressing
Doe's contention that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague. Citing
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 10 the court stated that "[a] statute must give adequate
warning of the conduct which is to be prohibited and must set out explicit
standards for those who apply it."III Judge Cohn found the key words of the
regulation to be "stigmatize" and "victimize," both of which "elude precise
definition."1 12 The court found it difficult to determine what conduct would be
held to "victimize or stigmatize."1 13 Thus, students would be "forced to guess at
whether a comment about a controversial issue would later be found to be
sanctionable under the policy." 1 4 Because of this uncertainty, the court also
found the university's policy to be unconstitutionally vague.115
2. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin
In May of 1988, the Board of Regents for the University of Wisconsin
System announced a plan called "Design for Diversity," which attempted to
increase minority representation, multi-cultural understanding, and diversity
10 8 Id
1091d
110 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
111 Univ. ofMich., 721 F. Supp. at 866.
1121d. at 867. In addition, the court remarked that simply because "a statement may
victimize or stigmatize an individual does not... strip it of protection under the accepted First
Amendment tests." Id.
113 Id. In order to demonstrate how difficult it was to differentiate between sanctionable
and non-sanctionable speech, Judge Cohn included the following passage: "During the oral
argument, the Court asked the university's counsel how he would distinguish between speech
which was merely offensive, which he conceded was protected, and speech which 'stigmatizes
or victimizes' on the basis of an invidious factor. Counsel replied 'very carefully."' Id
Unfortunately for students, "very carefully" does not provide much warning as to what
controversial speech will be sanctioned and what will not. To quote from Wayne Dick's appeal
letter to president Giamatti: 'If my sentence is not overturned, please advise me as to other
views that I am not allowed to criticize, so that I won't unknowingly violate my probation and
the standards of Yale University." See supra note 20.
114 See Univ. ofMich., 721 F. Supp. at 867.
1 15 Seeid at 867.
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throughout the education system. 116 The Design for Diversity was announced in
response to concerns over several racially motivated incidents throughout the
school system and included a provision to establish a committee charged with
draffing a system-wide hate speech code. 1 7 Because the University of Wisconsin
was aware that a court struck down Michigan's speech code, Wisconsin designed
a regulation far superior in both scope and clarity to Michigan's code.118 The
Board of Regents adopted the committee's proposed rule on June 9, 1989,119 and
in a little over a year, at least nine students were punished under the university's
speech regulation. 120 On March 29, 1990, the UWM Post and several individual
students filed suit against the Board of Regents, challenging the constitutionality
of the university's speech code by claiming that it violated their First Amendment
rights. 12 1 The university defended the regulation by arguing that the rule limited
only speech falling within the fighting words exception to the First Amendment
or in the alternative, that the Chaplinsky decision sets forth a balancing test
leaving the speech prohibited by the university's regulation unprotected by the
First Amendment.122
The court's decision begins with a discussion of the Chaplinsky decision12 3
and how the Supreme Court has narrowed the holding of Chaplinsky.124 The
court continued by applying the elements of the university's regulation to the
fighting words doctrine. The court concluded that the school's first defense failed
because the rule did not require that the regulated speech, by its very utterance,
tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace; thus, the "rule goes beyond the
116 UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
117 See id. at 1164-65 (describing the development of the University of Wisconsin's
speech regulation).
118 SHILL, supra note 3, at 78 (explaining how Wisconsin's speech code was more
limited in scope and was written with a higher degree of clarity).
119 See UWM, 774 F. Supp. at 1165-67. The court excerpts the University of Wisconsin's
speech regulation and part of the pamphlet the university circulated after the adoption of the
rule, which provided students with guidance as to the scope and application of the rule. See id.
120 Id. at 1167-68 (describing the situations surrounding the nine cases brought under the
university's speech regulation).
121 Id. at 1164.
122Id. at 1169.
123 See id. at 1169-70 (discussing the fighting words doctrine and how it has been
narrowed throughout the years); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
124 See UWA, 774 F. Supp. at 1169-70. The court cites several cases to show that the
fighting words doctrine has been limited to those words that tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace, including Collin v. Smith, 578 F2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). In Collin, the Seventh
Circuit struck down a town ordinance that prohibited the Nazi party from parading in the streets
of Skokie, Illinois, because the village did not "rely on a fear of responsive violence to justify
the ordinance." Id. at 1203. In the decision, the court stated: "A conviction for less than words
that at least tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace cannot be justified under
Chaplinsky." Id. (citing Gooding v. Oklahoma, 405 U.S. 518,524-27 (1972)).
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present scope of the fighting words doctrine. ' 125 The court noted that "[t]he
creation of a hostile environment may tend to incite an immediate breach of peace
under some circumstances," but the creation of a hostile environment can create
non-violent situations as well.126 The court, while acknowledging that it was
reasonable to expect hate speech to provoke a violent reaction, found that the
university's rule was overbroad in that it regulated speech "whether or not it [was]
likely to provoke such a response." 127 Since the regulation covered speech that
did not fall within the narrow definition of fighting words, the rule could not be
justified under the fighting words doctrine alone.
Next, the court considered whether the Chaplinsky decision set forth a
balancing test for determining if the speech regulated by the university's speech
code was actually protected by the First Amendment. The university argued that
the Chaplinsky Court used a balancing test to determine that fighting words were
not protected by the First Amendment 128 and that under this same test the speech
regulated by the school's code was also not protected.129 The court acknowledged
that the Supreme Court used a balancing test to determine whether fighting words
were protected by the First Amendment, but the court did not find evidence in the
Chaplinsky decision indicating that the Supreme Court intended to allow lower
courts to "employ a balancing approach to identify additional categories of speech
undeserving of protection."130 Although the court stated that the university's
balancing test was not applicable, the court found that even if a balancing test was
used, the regulation was still invalid because the costs of the rule outweighed the
benefits. 131
The university also attempted to justify its speech regulation by drawing an
analogy to Title VII law and its prohibition against the creation of a hostile
125 UW, 774 F. Supp. at 1172.
1261id
127 Id. at 1173.
128 See id (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572: "It has been well observed that ['fighting
words'] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.").
129 SW id
130 1d. The court also discussed the fact that the university's regulation was a content-
based restriction and that the Supreme Court is much more wary about upholding regulations
that are content-based. The court noted that the Supreme Court is more willing to allow a
restriction that "restrict[s] communication without regard to the message conveyed." The
university's regulation is not content-neutral, but rather limits speech based upon the message
conveyed, and thus receives a much closer degree of scrutiny. Id. at 1174 (quoting Geoffrey R.
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. CHn. L. REV. 81, 81 (1978)).
131 See UWM, 774 F. Supp. at 1174-77 (analyzing the costs and benefits of the
university's speech code).
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environment in the workplace.132 The court was unwilling to accept this analogy
for three reasons. Foremost, Title VII was meant to apply in the workplace, not in
the educational setting.133 Secondly, Title VII looks to agency principles for its
justification, and normally students are not agents of their school. 134 Lastly, Title
VII is only a statute and cannot supersede the requirements of the First
Amendment, so the regulation's First Amendment infirmities would still cause
the rule to be deemed unconstitutional.135
3. Sigma Chi v. George Mason University
Unlike the previous two cases, Iota X Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v.
George Mason University136 did not involve a challenge to an explicit hate
speech code, but rather, a fraternity challenging the constitutionality of a
disciplinary sanction imposed by a university. 137 As part of Derby Days, a week-
long fundraiser hosted by the Iota Xi chapter of Sigma Chi at George Mason, the
fraternity held an event called the 'ress a SIG contest" in which members of the
fraternity were dressed as "ugly women." 138 One member of the fraternity wore
black face paint, used pillows to represent breasts and buttocks, and wore a wig
with curlers.139 The following week, several campus student leaders petitioned
the school to discipline the fraternity because they were offended by the contest
and believed the contest "perpetuated racial and sexual stereotypes."'1 40 One week
later the university announced that it would sanction the fraternity.14 1
The fraternity contended that the school's punishment unconstitutionally
infringed upon its members' right to free expression protected by the First
Amendment. 142 The university countered by arguing that the fraternity's activity
1321rd. at 1177.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 iad
136 773 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Va. 1991).
137 See id at 792-93.
138 Id. at 793 (describing the "Dress a SIG" contest).
139 Id.
140 Id.1411Id.
142 See id at 793-94 (explaining the plaintiff's and defendant's theories of the case). The
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment must be given "breathing space" in order to
function properly. NAACP v. Buttons, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)). Speech will undoubtedly be chilled if speakers are
forced to defend everything they say against criminal charges. Furthermore, the Court has held
that even when a speaker is motivated by hate or ill will his speech is still protected by the First
Amendment:
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was not expression protected by the First Amendment. In the alternative, the
school contended that it had a compelling educational interest that justified the
sanctions imposed upon the fraternity.
The court began its opinion by stating the basic principle that state
universities cannot limit speech simply because they feel exposure to one group's
ideas will be harmful to other groups of students.143 The court dismissed the
university's contention that the fraternity's contest was conduct rather than
protected speech by noting that it was the expressive message conveyed by the
fraternity that was perceived offensive by the other students.144 The university did
not punish the fraternity for the act of dressing up, rather Sigma Chi was punished
for the message expressed when the fraternity members dressed the way they did.
Next, the court acknowledged that the university had an interest in
maintaining a diverse student body,145 but that the speech involved in this case
was consistent with another interest of the university-promoting the free flow
Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be
proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances
honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). Although its holding dealt specifically with the
defamation of a public figure, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), describes
how important parody and satire have been to the formation of our country. Id. at 53-55. Satire,
almost by definition, must be offensive to someone and will often go "beyond the bounds of
good taste and conventional manners." This does not, however, limit its First Amendment
protection. Id. at 54.
Accordingly, Wayne Dick's parody posters and the "Dress a SIG" contest held at George
Mason University do not lose their First Amendment protections simply because people were
offended by them. Wayne Dick's poster deserved the highest level of First Amendment
protection because it discussed, through satire, a public affair taking place within his
community, and the Supreme Court has stated, "speech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75.
143 George Mason, 773 F. Supp. at 793. The court stated in its conclusion that "[a]lthough
the university disagreed with the message propounded by the fraternity's activity, GMU may
not discipline the students by infringing on their First Amendment rights based on the perceived
offensive content of the activity." Id. at 795. The court went on to say that to punish the
fraternity's speech for its perceived offensiveness is equivalent to imposing a "heckler's veto,"
that is, allowing the listener to prevent speech because the listener does not agree or approve. Id
The heckler's veto has been deemed an impermissible infringement of the First Amendment.
Id.; see also Downs, supra note 42, at 634 ('To allow hostile audiences to cause the
abridgement of speech in such instances would be to make audiences the ultimate judges of
constitutional rights.").
144See George Mason, 773 F. Supp. at 794.
145 More specifically, the university claimed the fratemity's behavior undermined "the
education of minority and women students, the university's mission to promote learning
through a culturally diverse student body, the university's mission to eliminate racist and sexist
behavior on campus and the university's mission to accomplish maximal desegregation of its
student body." Id.
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and expression of ideas. 146 The court held that, because the fraternity's contest
did not substantially nor materially disrupt the university's educational mission,
the school was not justified in punishing the fraternity.147
4. Dambrot v. Central Michigan University
In Dambrot v. Central Michigan University,148 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with deciding whether the district court had properly struck
down a university's discriminatory harassment policy as being facially
unconstitutional. The case arose out of an incident where the school's basketball
coach told his players during a locker room session that they "need[ed] to have
more niggers on our team. 149 The players often referred to themselves as niggers
to connote "a person who is fearless, mentally strong and tough." 150 Coach
Dambrot stated that he used the term in the same positive manner as the players
used it.151 In addition, none of the African-American players stated that they were
offended by the coach's use of the word.152 One member of the school's
affirmative action office believed the coach's comments violated the university's
harassment policy and recommended he be disciplined.1 53 Dambrot accepted an
informal punishment instead of a more formal investigation and possibly a more
severe punishment.154
However, on April 12, 1993, the school's athletic director informed Coach
Dambrot that the school would be hiring a new head basketball coach for the next
season.155 The announcement of Coach Dambrot's termination came after
national news attention was drawn to the university by student demonstrations
protesting Dambrot's comments.156 The coach then filed suit against the
university claiming that he was fired because he used the word "nigger," and thus,
his termination violated the First Amendment1 57 Several members of the
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995).
149 I, at 1180. Supposedly, the coach asked the players if it was acceptable for him to use
the word "nigger" before he made his comments. Id.
150Id.
151Id.
152 When people outside the basketball team found out Coach Dambrot had used the word
"nigger," the school interviewed all the members of the basketball team and none reported
being offended by the coach's comments. Id. at 1181.
153 Id.
154It
155 The university stated that it "believed Dambrot was no longer capable of effectively
leading the men's basketball program." Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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basketball team joined the suit claiming the university's harassment policy was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague in violation of their First Amendment
rights.' 58
The district court ruled that the university's discriminatory-harassment policy
was unconstitutional on its face.159 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
"first step in analyzing an overbreadth claim is to 'determine whether the
regulation reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech."' 160
The university defended its policy by claiming that the policy contained a
provision explicitly protecting students' First Amendment rights.' 61 The court
cited the University of Michigan's failed defense in University of Michigan,
namely that the school would not enforce its speech code in such a way as to
offend the First Amendment.162 The court in University of Michigan found the
code was applied on several occasions to speech protected by the First
Amendment.1 63 The Dambrot court concluded its analysis of step one by stating
"there is nothing to ensure the university will not violate First Amendment rights
even if that is not their intention. It is clear from the text of the policy that
language, ... regardless of political value, can be prohibited upon the initiative of
the university."'164 The possibility of the almost unlimited scope of the school's
policy creates a "realistic danger" that the regulation could be used to violate First
Amendment protections. 165
The second step in analyzing an overbreadth claim is to determine "whether
the policy is 'substantially overbroad and constitutionally invalid under the void
for vagueness doctrine." ' 166 There are two ways a regulation may be
unconstitutionally vague: (1) it denies fair notice of sanctionable conduct and
(2) it is an unrestricted delegation of power to leave the definition to those
enforcing it.167 In this case, Central Michigan's policy prohibited conduct
considered offensive by the university. However, the court stated that "different
158 Id.
159 See generally Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993). The
district court also held that the termination of the coach did not violate the Constitution,
however this note is only concerned with the court's holding pertaining to the harassment
policy.
160 Danbrot, 55 F.3d at 1182.
161 Specifically, the harassment policy contained a provision, which read: "'The university
will not extend its application of discriminatory harassment so far as to interfere impermissibly
with individuals['] rights to free speech."' Id. at 1183.
162ITd.
163 See supra note 96 (discussing the University of Michigan's enforcement of its speech
policy against speech protected by the First Amendment).
164Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1183.
165 1d. at 1181.
166 Id. (quoting Leonardson v. City of E. Lansing, 896 F.2d 190, 195-96 (6th Cir. 1990)).
167 See id. at 1183-84 (describing the two ways a statute can be unconstitutionally vague).
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people find different things offensive. '168 The facts of this case clearly illustrate
the court's point. Several players stated that Coach Dambrot's comment did not
offend them, but the statement offended those who complained about it to the
university. Because the policy allowed university officials to define what speech
would violate the regulation, the court found the statute to be unconstitutionally
vague.169
D. Summing Up the Lower Federal Court Cases
Each of these four cases struck a major blow against the proponents of
campus hate speech codes. The University of Michigan decision represents the
first case to address the constitutionality of campus speech codes and thus laid out
the general principles for analyzing speech regulations. 170 The judge in University
ofMichigan was aware that the university had a duty to provide equal educational
opportunities, but held that this goal could not be achieved at the expense of the
First Amendment.' 71 For those who discounted the University of Michigan
decision as simply a court striking down a poorly written speech regulation, the
UWM decision could not have been good news. First, the University of
Wisconsin was aware of the University of Michigan decision and could
presumably use the decision to aid in crafting a regulation that would be
constitutional. Second, when challenged in court the University of Wisconsin
employed a much more sophisticated defense than the University of Michigan
used in defending its speech code.172 With both of these factors working in its
favor, Wisconsin's hate speech regulation was still struck down as an
unconstitutional infingement of the First Amendment.
George Mason and Central Michigan reversed decisions by state universities
to discipline speech, but in these cases there was no explicit hate speech code in
place. The courts, however, applied the analysis employed when an explicit hate
168Id. at 1184.
169 Id. ("The CMU policy, as written, does not provide fair notice of what speech will
violate the policy. Defining what is offensive is... wholly delegated to university
officials .... For these reasons, the CMU policy is also void for vagueness.').
170 In University of Michigan, the court announced four principles for analyzing hate
speech codes. One, a university cannot regulate speech because it disagrees with the ideas or
message conveyed. Two, a university cannot regulate speech because it finds the speech
offensive. Three, a university cannot regulate speech because it believes others will find the
speech offensive. Four, these principles need to be even more stringently enforced in the
university setting because the need for an "unfettered interplay of competing views is essential
to the institution's educational mission." Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
171 Id. at 868.
172 The University of Wisconsin argued that the regulation was justified under the fighting
words doctrine, under the balancing test laid out in Chaplinsky, and under an analogy to Title
VII law. UWM, 774 F. Supp. at 1169.
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speech code exists to a situation where the speech regulation was implicit thus
reaffirming and demonstrating the strength of the principles set forth in University
of Michigan for analyzing these attempts to regulate campus speech.173 Both
cases also added to the analysis of campus hate speech codes by explicitly
rejecting the compelling educational interest argument 74 and by stating that the
regulation cannot make an "unrestricted delegation of power" to university
officials to define what is offensive, thus eliminating any level of notice.175
Finally, all four cases support the proposition that a state university cannot
prohibit speech because it finds the speech offensive or it disagrees with the
speech. Most importantly, all four decisions affirm the idea that a state university
cannot achieve certain goals by sacrificing the protections guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
E. The Supreme Court Chimes In
In 1992, the Supreme Court entered the fray by addressing the
constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting the placing on public or private
property "a symbol, object appellation, characterization or graffiti ... which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."'176 Although this case
did not involve a campus hate speech code per se, the Court's First Amendment
analysis can be applied to the university setting. In RA. V v. City of St. Paul, a
juvenile petitioner was prosecuted under this city ordinance for burning a cross on
the property of a black family that lived in the community.177 R.A.V. moved to
dismiss the charges contending the ordinance was both overbroad and
impermissibly content-based under the First Amendment. 178 Although the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ordinance,179 the Supreme Court reversed
173 See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
174 Sigma Chi v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792,794 (E.D. Va. 1991).
175 Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d. 1177, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1995).
176 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN.,
LEGiS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
177 Id. at 379.
178 Id. at 380.
179 1d. at 380-81. The Minnesota high court limited the ordinance's coverage so that it
only prohibited fighting words, and therefore held the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment because fighting words are capable of being regulated consistent with the First
Amendment. Additionally, the court found that the "ordinance [was] narrowly tailored" to
achieve the compelling state interest of preventing bias-motivated crimes. Id. The United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary apparently agreed with the Minnesota high court because
the committee submitted a report with the following language: "The hate crime atomizes the
individual, splitting the individual victim apart from his or her neighbors and community. It
isolates the victim because of who he or she is." S. REP. No. 104-269, at 3 (1996).
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this decision and held that the ordinance violated First Amendment
protections.180
The Supreme Court, through Justice Scalia, stated that content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid181 and that even the narrow categories
referred to in Chaplinsky1 82 are not "worthless and undeserving of constitutional
protection." 183 The Court also stated that the power to restrict speech on one basis
does not translate into the government being able to regulate the same speech on
some other basis.184 For example, the state could pass a statute banning obscenity
on television, but allowing all other forms of obscenity because this prohibition
would not be content-based. 185 Whereas, the state could not-consistent with the
First Amendment-ban defamation against the Republican party while allowing
defamation against the Democratic party.186
Applying these concepts to the St. Paul ordinance, the Court stated that this
regulation only prohibits fighting words that provoke violence on the basis of race
and gender while allowing all other types of fighting words.187 In essence, the
city was attempting to place limitations on speakers who espouse views on
subjects that St. Paul's city council deemed "disfavored." 188 Moreover, the Court
stated that this ordinance is more than just content biased; it is also viewpoint
biased.189 Under this ordinance, "[o]ne could hold up a sign saying, for example,
Others propose strong reasons why the state should not sanction hate speech. Lawrence,
supra note 30, at 435-36 ('CThere are very strong reasons for protecting even racist speech.
Perhaps the most important reasons are that it reinforces our society's commitment to the value
of tolerance, and that by shielding racist speech from government regulation, we will be forced
to combat it as a community."). See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 93.
180 R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 391 (stating that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional even
when narrowly construed).
18 11d. at 382.
182 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (referring specifically to
obscenity, defamation, and fighting words).
183 R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 385 (quoting concurring opinion at 401).
184 Id. at 385-86. The Court compares fighting words to sound coming out of a "noisy
sound truck" because both are a mode of speech. The government can regulate the sound truck
but not on the basis of the message coming out of the sound truck. Id.
185 Id. at 386-87 (comparing the "noisy sound truck" to fighting words).
186To allow the government to pass laws prohibiting defamation against only the
Republican party would "raiseo the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Id. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
187 R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 391 ('CThose who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection with
other ideas--to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality-are not covered.").
188 Id.
189Id.
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that all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists' are, for that
would insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of religion."'" 90
The city, making an argument similar to those made in the campus hate
speech cases, contended that it had an obligation to confront notions of bigotry.
The Supreme Court agreed that the city had such an obligation, but "the manner
of that confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech." 191 The
Court emphasized that regulation of fighting words is not based on the idea the
speaker wishes to convey, but rather the mode of communicating those ideas.192
The St. Paul ordinance did not simply proscribe a particular mode of expression,
but rather, proscribed a particular mode of expression based on the viewpoint
expressed. 193 The Supreme Court held that this type of viewpoint censorship
cannot be tolerated.194
A year later, the Supreme Court addressed hate crimes again in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.195 The defendant in Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery, a
crime normally carrying a maximum sentence of two years in prison.196
However, because the jury found that the defendant chose his victim on account
of the victim's race, the maximum sentence was increased to seven years under
Wisconsin's penalty enhancement statute.197 The defendant was then sentenced
190 Id. at 391-92. Then Scalia threw in one of his zingers: "St. Paul has no such authority
to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules." Id. at 392.
1911Id.
192 Id. at 393-94.
193 Id
194 Id at 396 ('CThe politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express [their] hostility-but not
through a means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who (however benightedly)
disagree.").
195 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
196 Id. at480.
197 Id The legislative history behind hate crime statutes often demonstrates the
legislature's aim is to punish bias-motivated crimes committed against minorities. See, eg,
H.R. REP. No. 105-845, at 54-57 (1998) (discussing the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997
and describing hate crimes committed against homosexual men and women); H.R REP. No.
103-244, at 1-2 (1993) (discussing the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993 and
describing hate crimes being committed against a Chinese-American man, a Jewish Temple, a
homosexual man, and an Ethiopian man). Nothing in the language of hate crime statutes,
however, keeps them from being used by the govemment to punish members of minority
groups. For example, the defendant in Wisconsin v. Mitchell was an African-American male.
508 U.S. at 479. See also Todd Spangler, Restaurant Shooting Suspect Charged, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 3,2000, at 14A (reporting that an African-American man was charged with
ethnic intimidation after going on a shooting rampage where he allegedly purposely shot at
Whites, while telling non-Whites to get out of the way); Lasson, supra note 31, at 76 n.183
(noting one of the students punished under the University of Michigan's speech code was a
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to four years in prison.198 The defendant challenged the sentence enhancement
statute contending it was a violation of his First Amendment rights according to
the Supreme Court's decision in RA. V and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
agreed.199
The United States Supreme Court recognized the statute did punish criminal
conduct as Wisconsin had argued, but stated that the enhancement provision
increased the maximum penalty based upon defendant's discriminatory
viewpoint 200 A defendant committing the same crime without this discriminatory
viewpoint will be punished less severely than the person who has a racist motive.
The Court observed, however, that courts have traditionally considered many
factors when determining sentences, and motive is one of the most important of
these factors2 01 A defendant cannot be punished for holding certain abstract
beliefs regardless of how offensive these beliefs may be to the sentencing judge.
The judge may not even consider these beliefs for\sentencing purposes. The
defendant's abstract beliefs may be considered only if these beliefs are relevant to
aggravating factors traditionally considered at sentencing.20 2 Thus, a judge may
not punish a defendant more severely because the judge does not like the fact that
the defendant is a racist. However, the judge may punish the defendant if the fact
the defendant is a racist is relevant to an aggravating factor of the crime.203
Black law student who called another student "white trash"). Additionally, Nat Hentoff quotes
from a brief submitted to the Supreme Court in the R.A. V case:
[I]f the St Paul ordinance had been in effect in the South during the 1950s, it could have been
used to prosecute a black family for putting a sign on their front lawn demanding: "Integrate all-
white schools now!" That speech would certainly have "arouse[d] anger, alarm, or resentment
in others on the basis of race."
H1E1NTOFF, supra note 2, at 259-60.
198 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 481.
199 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992). The Wisconsin high court
clearly relying upon the R.A. V decision wrote: "the Wisconsin legislature cannot criminalize
bigoted thought with which it disagrees." Id. at 815.
200 508 U.S. at 484-85.
201 Id. at 485.
202 Id. at 485-86 (discussing the difference between punishing a defendant based upon his
abstract beliefs and punishments based upon aggravating factors of the crime).
203 Compare Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), with Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1982) (plurality opinion). In Dawson, the Court held that the admission of
evidence pertaining to a capital defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, a racist hate
group, violated the defendant's First Amendment rights of association and free speech.
Dawson, 503 U.S. at 167. The Court found that this evidence proved nothing more than that the
defendant harbored racist beliefs. In Barclay, four African-American men kidnapped,
repeatedly stabbed, and shot a White man twice in the head for the admitted purpose of starting
a "race war." Barclay, 463 U.S. at 942-44. The trial judge sentenced two of the defendants to
death and used these defendants' racist motivations as one of the aggravating factors a judge in
Florida must find before imposing a death sentence. Id. at 948 n.6. In affirming the trial judge's
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The defendant argued that the statute punished him for his motive separate
from his actual crime. The Court, however, stated that the motive in the
Wisconsin statute is used in the same way as it is used in the federal anti-
discrimination laws, which have been upheld against First Amendment
challenges.204 Finally, the Court differentiated the RA.V decision from this
decision by stating the ordinance in R.A. V was aimed at conduct protected by the
First Amendment, whereas the Wisconsin statute was not.205
In 1995, the Supreme Court addressed what at first might seem to be a
corollary issue, but, in actuality, has significant implications for those favoring
campus hate speech codes. In Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of
Virginia,206 the Supreme Court struck down the school's policy of refusing to
fund organizations promoting "a particular belie[f ] in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality."207 At first glance, Rosenberger appears to simply involve a
university attempting to maintain a firm line between church and state, however,
the Court's discussion of viewpoint discrimination reaffrms the holding of R.A. V
and also demonstrates that R.A. V's holding applies on college campuses.208
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia had a program for funding all
student organizations, except student groups seeking funding for religious
activities.209 When several undergraduates formed a student magazine dedicated
to promoting tolerance for Christian viewpoints and sought funding for the
magazine from the university, the school rejected the group's request.210 The
school, after examining the first issue of the group's magazine, based its rejection
on the policy prohibiting the funding of activities that promote a religious
perspective.211 After losing their campus appeal of the funding decision, the
plaintiffs filed suit in federal court claiming the refusal to fund was made solely
consideration of the defendant's racial motives in imposing the death penalty, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the plurality stated, "[tjhe United States Constitution does not prohibit a
trial judge from taking into account the elements of racial hatred in this murder. The judge in
this case found [the defendants'] desire to start a race war relevant to several statutory
aggravating factors." Id. at 949. Thus, in Dawson, the defendant's racist beliefs were irrelevant
to the case and only served to inflame the jury. Whereas, in Barclay, the judge did not punish
the defendants because of their racist beliefs, but rather, these beliefs were relevant to Florida's
statutory aggravating factors.
2 04 Id. at 487. See generally Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (upholding
Title VII against a First Amendment challenge by the employer).
205 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
206 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
20 7 Id. at 823, 837.
20 8 See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
209 515 U.S. at 823-25 (describing the school's procedure for funding extracurricular
activities).
2 10 Id. at 825-27 (introducing the plaintiff in Rosenberger and explaining how this
organization attempted to receive funding through the university).
211 Id. at 827.
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upon the group's religious viewpoint, thus violating their First Amendment
rights 2
12
The Court began its opinion by pointing out that although content-based
restrictions on speech are strongly disfavored, viewpoint restrictions are an even
more egregious infringement of First Amendment rights.213 The university
argued that the policy was a content-based restriction, but the Court found the
policy to be a viewpoint restriction because the school did not exclude religion as
a subject matter, but rather, denied funding only to activities with religious
viewpoints. 214 That is to say that the school did not prohibit a student paper from
printing an article explaining the various religions of ancient Mesopotamia.
However, an article discussing birth control from a religious point of view would
violate the school's policy. Of course, an article discussing birth control from a
feminist perspective would be perfectly acceptable under the university's policy.
This disparate treatment of similar topics led the Court to state "the University
may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints."2 15
The Court also took a strong stance against viewpoint restrictions on college
campuses. Calling universities "one of the vital centers for the Nation's
intellectual life," the Court found that the school's regulation risked suppressing
the creative power of students.2 16 Since the Renaissance, universities have
traditionally been places dedicated to dialogue, and viewpoint restrictions are
inapposite to this long tradition.2 17 If the University of Virginia's policy were
allowed to stand, a great deal of the speech of such "hypothetical students" as
Plato, Spinoza, Descartes, Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Sartre would have been
suppressed because each included the promotion of an ultimate reality in their
writings. 218 The Court's discussion of the importance of free expression on
college campuses may be taken as a sign that the Supreme Court is suspicious of
attempts to limit First Amendment rights on the campuses of American
universities.
212/Id.
2 13 Id at 829 ('The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.").
214Id. at 831.
2 151Id. at 835. The Court stated that viewpoint restrictions pose two dangers to the First
Amendment: (1) it grants the government the power to examine a publication to determine if
the publication meets with the state's approval and (2) it also raises the possibility of chilling
thought and expression. Id.
216 Id. at 836.
2 17 Id.
2 18 Id. at 836-37.
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F. TheEndofPhasel
The decisions of these federal courts in the 1990s have effectively ended the
first round of battles over the constitutionality of campus hate speech codes. The
proponents of hate speech codes primarily attempted to justify speech regulations
by a combination of the fighting words doctrine2 19 and the University Mission
Model.220 The federal courts tested the constitutionality of hate speech code
justifications by examining the codes for overbreadth, vagueness, and
content/viewpoint neutrality.
Although each court that addressed the issue agreed that a school could limit
fighting words, the courts also agreed that speech codes relying on the fighting
words doctrine would be unconstitutionally overbroad if the regulation swept up a
substantial amount of protected speech at the same time. In addition, the courts
will accept the fighting words doctrine only if it is limited to speech that, by its
very utterance, tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace. The vagueness
doctrine also limits the applicability of the fighting words justification. If a
regulation does not give notice to students that particular speech can be punished,
the speech code will be deemed unconstitutionally vague.221 A speech regulation
that delegates to those enforcing the code unrestricted power to decide what
speech will be punished is also unconstitutionally vague.222
Several courtsagreed with the proponents of hate speech codes and stated
that universities have an obligation to promote racial diversity and tolerance.
However, these courts stated that these obligations may not be met at the expense
of the First Amendment While students do not shed their constitutional rights at
the schoolhouse gate,223 courts are apparently very willing to place the First
Amendment in a higher position once one passes through the university gates. In
2 19 See supra Part I.B3.
220 See supra Part I.B.2.
221 Speech codes often run into problems when they say "offensive speech" can be
punished, because offensiveness is a relative term. As Wayne Dick wrote in his letter to
president Giamatti: "I have seen many posters [around campus] that I thought were worthless
and offensive, but I respect others' right to express their views ... : Dick saw posters he found
offensive go unpunished, while he was punished because others found his poster offensive. The
sarcastic, but enlightening line with which Dick ended his letter to Giamatti exemplifies the
problem vagueness poses to a student desiring to express controversial ideas: "If my sentence is
not overturned, please advise me as to other views that I am also not allowed to criticize, so that
I won't unknowingly violate my probation and the standards of Yale University." See Shiell,
supra note 3, at 52.
222 This type of vagueness threatens to chill speech on campus because vague codes allow
college administrators to make ad hoc determinations of what is punishable. A student has no
idea whether his speech is permissible until the administration passes judgment on it after the
student has already made his comments and placed his neck on the chopping block. Thus, if a
student fears the chopping block, the student would be wise to keeps his ideas to himself.
223 Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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order for a university to limit hate speech, the speech must substantially and
materially disrupt the university's mission. The decision about whether speech
substantially and materially disrupts a university's mission must be made with
recognition of the important position the right to freedom of expression holds on a
university campus.
Finally, courts in, the 1990s announced a requirement that placed a major
constitutional obstacle in front of campus hate speech codes-content/viewpoint
neutrality. This obstacle will be a difficult requirement to overcome for those
proponents of speech codes who justify the codes using the fighting words
doctrine or those who argue that the codes should only punish hate speech
directed toward minorities. These federal court decisions teach that the power to
limit speech for one reason does not mean that the state has the power to prohibit
the same speech on another basis. In sum, the federal courts have prohibited
universities from silencing the expression of selected viewpoints for whatever
reason.
It is possible that future courts will overrule decisions like Doe v. University
of Michigan or R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, but the principles of those decisions
seem to be firmly rooted in First Amendment law. As each year goes by stare
decisis becomes stronger and the likelihood of courts going in a different direction
becomes less probable. More than likely, the proponents of campus hate speech
codes will have to replace the traditional justifications for the codes with new
reasons for support. The next Part will examine possible replacements for the
traditional justifications for college hate speech regulations.
II-. PHASE 11-WHAT's NEXT FOR WAYNE DICK
The best future strategy for proponents of hate speech codes might be to
combine failed past attempts into one coherent policy. This combination theory
should involve elements that provide a First Amendment justification and a
constitutionally valid framework for limiting speech.2 24 The combination of
elements from the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District225 with aspects derived from Title VII workplace
discrimination law does just that. Neither Tinker nor Title VII by itself provides a
constitutionally sufficient justification for limiting speech,226 but by combining
these two theories, proponents of speech codes would have a First Amendment
justification for limiting speech and an accepted framework for doing so.
224 In Phase I speech codes were routinely struck down because they lacked a sufficient
justification in one or both of these areas. See, e.g., supra notes 82, 111, 125, 127, 143, and 164
and accompanying text. Thus, any proposed justification for a hate speech code should focus on
covering these two areas.
225 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 26 See infra Parts III.A.2 and III.B.2 (explaining why neither Tinker nor Title VII is
sufficient by itself).
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A. The Tinker Prong
In Phase I of the hate speech code debate, the proponents of the codes
primarily attempted to justify the codes' constitutionality on First Amendment
grounds. The proponents contended hate speech codes could be limited because
of the fighting words doctrine or because of the low perceived value of hate
speech. Opponents of the codes primarily decided to defend their position by
waving the First Amendment flag because the Court often interprets exceptions to
the First Amendment quite narrowly. Thus, proponents of speech codes were
fighting the battle over hate speech codes on their opponents' home turf. The
proponents would have been better off fighting on friendlier grounds.
The Tinker prong of the combination theory provides proponents of speech
codes with a constitutional justification for limiting speech that does not overstep
its own authority. The Court's holding in Tinker allows proponents of speech
codes to confront opponents of the codes with First Amendment precedent of
their own, but does not require the proponents to rest their entire justification on
the Court's holding.227 Instead, it builds a solid First Amendment foundation and
provides a jumping offpoint for the second prong of the theory.
1. The Tinker Court's Holding
It is important to appreciate the Tinker Court's ruling because it lays much of
the framework for analyzing First Amendment issues in the public school setting.
Nearly every case with issues concerning the First Amendment rights of students
cites Tinker.228 Although the specific facts of Tinker revolve around a public high
school setting, the Supreme Court has applied the holding of Tinker to cases
involving First Amendment rights of college students.229
227 In Phase I, the courts would often agree that justifications such as the fighting words
doctrine would allow a university to restrict speech on campus. The problem with the
universities' codes was that they relied upon the fighting words doctrine to limit speech beyond
fighting words. Thus, courts were willing to accept the theory that universities could restrict
speech, but were not willing to accept the breadth universities attempted to give to their First
Amendment justifications. See, ag., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862-64
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (explaining that the school is justified in restricting fighting words, libel,
slander, obscene speech, but may not limit speech outside these categories simply because the
university does not approve of the speech).
228 A Westlaw Keycite search of the iznker decision on August 16, 2000, found 3,216
cites to inker.
2 29 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972) (citing lYnker to support the proposition that
"[a]ssociational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules,
interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an
education").
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In December of 1965, a group of students decided to wear black armbands to
school in order to publicize their objections to the Vietnam conflict 230 The
principals of the Des Moines public schools decided to implement a policy
forcing students to remove the black armbands at school.2 31 Refusing to remove
the armband would result in suspension from school until the student returned
without the armband.2 32 On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker, a thirteen-year-old
junior high student, and Christopher Eckhardt, a sixteen-year-old high school
student, wore black armbands to school and were sent home for refusing to
remove the armbands. 233 The next day, John Tinker, a fifteen-year-old high
school student wore a black band to school and was also suspended until he
returned without the armband.2 34 The fathers of the students then filed suit in
federal court claiming their children's First Amendment rights were violated by
the school's policy.235
The Court began its opinion with a now famous statement. "It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."236 With this statement, the
Court acknowledged that simply by virtue of being a student, a citizen of the
United States does not lose her First Amendment rights. On the other hand, the
Court acknowledged the importance of the school's interest in maintaining
control and discipline.2 37 These two concepts can often come into conflict. This
has allowed for showdowns like the campus hate speech code debate because
each side rests its argument on one or the other of these two passages.
The district court upheld the school's policy because the court found the
administration's action was reasonable in light of the school's fear of a
disturbance created by students wearing the black armbands.2 38 The Supreme
Court strenuously disagreed with the district court's holding. The Court
rationalized that "[a]ny departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.
Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear."239 The Court
continued by stating that for school officials to prohibit the speech of their
students the officials must show that allowing the speech would "materially and
230 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 503.
235 Id. at 504.
236 Id at 506.
237 Id. at 507. While the Court acknowledged the school must be able to develop policies
that enable the administration to maintain order, the Court stated that all of these discretionary
functions can be "perform[ed] within the limits of the Bill of Rights" Id. (quoting W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,637 (1942)).
238 Id. at 508.
239 Id.
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substantially" interfere with school discipline or the rights of other students 240
Since the district court found no evidence that the administration had any reason
to believe "that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students," the Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts.241
The Court concluded its opinion by reaffirming the idea that students are
citizens under the Constitution, and thus their fundamental rights must be
respected. 242 The Court held that students are not to be treated as receptacles for
only officially approved expression, rather "[tlhe classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas."' 243 The Court also noted that the schools are responsible
for training young men and women how to differentiate between different
viewpoints. 244 Finally, the Court explicitly states that the First Amendment
should be circumvented only in very narrowly defined circumstances. 245 In the
school setting this means that expression may be limited only on a "showing that
the students' activities would materially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school."2 46
2. The Weakness of Tinker in the Hate Speech Code Setting
Proponents of hate speech codes would probably lose future court battles if
they relied solely upon Tinker to justify speech regulations on college campuses
because Tinker provides little guidance as to what actually constitutes a "material
and substantial" disruption. Although some would disagree, it would seem
difficult to argue that all hate speech constitutes a material and substantial
disruption to the school environment.2 47 Thus, a flat ban on all hate speech
24 0 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). The school
must show that the restriction is based on more than just a desire to avoid a controversial or
unpleasant topic. Id.
241 Id
2 4 2 Id. at511.
243 Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y.,
385 U.S. 589,603 (1967)).
244 Id. at 512. "The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
than through any kind of authoritative selection."' Id. (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
245 Id.at 513.
246 Id.
247 An example of speech that was considered hate speech by a university, but is difficult
to say materially and substantially disrupted the school environment is the statement by the
student in a University of Michigan dentistry class who had charges filed against him by his
teacher for saying, "he had heard that minorities had a difficult time in the class and he had
heard that they were not treated fairly." Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (quoting the originally filed complaint). The comment was made during a
small group discussion period, which was designed to allay the fears of students before taking
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justified by the premise that all hate speech causes a material and substantial
disruption to the school environment should be deemed facially unconstitutional.
Justifying codes in this manner is similar to the position proponents took in
Phase I when they relied solely upon the fighting words doctrine, and of course,
as already discussed, this method failed.2 48 To ban all hate speech on Tinker
grounds would mean that speech that does not cause a material and substantial
disruption would be caught up with speech that does cause such disruptions. In
Phase I, the courts were repeatedly unwilling to allow universities to use the
fighting words doctrine to ban speech that did not technically constitute fighting
words.249 Consequently, the courts should be equally unwilling to ban speech that
does not cause a material and substantial disruption to the operation of a
university.
3. What Tinker Brings to the Tinker-Title Vii Theory
In Tinker, the Court firmly stated that students do have First Amendment
rights that are not easily circumvented by the school's administration. At the same
time, the Court explicitly stated when the school may infringe on the free
expression rights of students. A student may freely express her opinion, unless it
materially and substantially interferes with school discipline or the rights of other
students. Thus, Tinker brings a First Amendment justification to the Tinker-Title
VII theory. Although, the Tinker prong does not attempt to define what speech
can actually be restricted, it provides a constitutional basis for regulating speech
that interferes with school discipline or the rights of other students.
By implementing the Tinker-Title VII justification for speech regulations,
proponents of hate speech codes possess sound constitutional reasons to limit
speech on campus. Tinker stands for the proposition that school officials have the
authority to limit speech that materially and substantially interferes with the
operation of the school. Thus, the question becomes, what speech materially and
substantially disrupts school activity? In Phase I, proponents of hate speech codes
would have likely said that all hate speech materially and substantially disrupts
the functioning of a school. As has been previously demonstrated, courts were
unwilling to agree with this proposition and consequently struck down the
proponents' speech regulations.
what was supposed to be one of the most difficult classes in the dentistry program. The students
were placed in these small groups to discuss problems they anticipated would arise during the
class. Thus, this student was doing exactly what he was supposed to be doing when he made the
comment. It can hardly be said that this student's comment materially and substantially
disrupted the classroom, yet the university still found the comment violated its ban on hate
speech.
248 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 101, 123-27 and accompanying text.
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The Tinker prong of the inker-Title VII theory does not contend that all hate
speech materially and substantially disrupts school activities; rather, it stands for
the principle that if speech materially and substantially disrupts the operation of a
school, it can be restricted consistent with the Constitution. The Tinker prong
leaves the responsibility of defining what hate speech will be restricted to the Title
VII prong.
B. The Title VH Prong
As discussed in the preceding section, the language of the Supreme Court's
decision in Tinker provides the proponents of hate speech codes with First
Amendment ammunition justifying the existence of speech codes. Title VII, the
second prong of the theory, provides proponents with a judicially accepted
framework for speech regulation. Although sexual, racial, ethnic, and other forms
of harassment often involve speech, even the most ardent supporters of the First
Amendment do not claim that the amendment gives people the right to sexually,
racially, or ethnically harass others.2 50 To this extent, many have argued that the
guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
enforce the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
should be used as a model for the regulation of hate speech on college
campuses.2 51 By demonstrating that speech violating Title VII allows school
officials to reasonably forecast a substantial and material disruption of school
activities or the rights of other students, the proponents of campus hate speech
codes should be able to justify a limitation on this speech.
1. Title VJ7Law
The Civil Rights Act of 1964252 prohibits discrimination in employment
based on race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.2 53 The Civil Rights Act
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to enforce the
2 50 See SmELL, supra note 3, at 97 (discussing how the ACLU, Justice Scalia, and Nat
Hentoff all support the restriction of "systematic, repeated verbal harassment that substantially
interferes with the target's functioning").
251 See, e.g., Ellen E. Lange, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First
Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 120 (1990) (suggesting that a speech code based
on Title VII law will be able to survive constitutional scrutiny).
2 52 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (1998) (restricting an employer's ability "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of'
various individual characteristics, such as race or sex).
253 Id; see also SHML,, supra note 3, at 99-100 (explaining section 703(a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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provisions of the Act.254 The EEOC has promulgated guidelines on
discrimination that define different forms of harassment.2 55 In Meritor Savings
Bank; FSB v. Vinson,256 the Supreme Court "explicitly endorsed the EEOC
interpretation of sexual harassment as including hostile work environments. r257
In Harris v. Forlift Systems, Inc.,258 the Supreme Court attempted to explain
more clearly what constitutes a hostile environment. Harris involved a female
manager who was constantly belittled by her company's president because she
was a woman.259 Additionally, the president of Forklift Systems made sexual
advances toward Harris.260 The combination of the insults and the sexual
advances caused Harris to quit 261 The Court concluded that not every derogatory
comment made in the employment setting creates a hostile work environment and
violates Title VII.262 The Court also announced that the plaintiff does not have to
254 SHEL, supra note 3, at 100.
255 See, e.g., EEOC Decisions, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1890 (1986). The EEOC
guidelines define sexual harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment
Id.
Although the EEOC's guidelines are not binding on courts, the Supreme Court has stated
that they "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65
(1985) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co, v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see also Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assoc., 112 F.3d
1503, 1505-07 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII in recognizing a
cause of action under that statute for same sex discrimination); DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d
298, 311 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing the EEOC's Guidelines to help determine if plaintiff has
established a valid claim for harassment).
256 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2 57 SHIELL, supra note 3, at 103.
2 58 510 US. 17 (1993).
2 591d. at 19. The president of Forklift Systems made such comments as, "You're a
woman, what do you know," 'We need a man as rental manager," and "[You're] a dumb ass
woman." Id.
260°Id at 19.
261.1d.
262 Id. at 21 ("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.").
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suffer an emotional breakdown in order to recover for a violation of Title VII.2 63
The Supreme Court held that courts should employ a totality of the circumstances
test when determining whether a hostile work environment has been created. 264
The Court then listed factors courts should consider when looking at the totality
of the situation.2 65
Thus, in cases like Meritor and Haris, lower federal court decisions
implementing Supreme Court precedents, and thousands of EEOC hearings,
courts and federal agencies have upheld a framework for limiting speech because
it violates Title VII and creates a hostile work environment. Additionally, the
Supreme Court in RA. V carved out an exception to the First Amendment for
speech violating Title VII.2 66 Since courts have upheld Title VII limitations on
speech, proponents of campus hate speech codes have attempted to create campus
codes based on Title VII. These codes, however, have also run into considerable
opposition in Phase I of the hate speech code debate.
2. The Weakness of Title VHJLaw in the Hate Speech Code Setting
Title VII as a justification for campus hate speech codes, has already been
found insufficient to support speech regulations by at least one federal court.267 In
UWM, the school attempted to justify the university's speech regulation by
analogizing the school setting to the workplace environment protected by Title
VII and therefore contended Title VII should also apply to school
environments.2 68 The court in UWM noted that although Title VII requires an
263 Id. at 22. Thus, actions violating Title VII fall somewhere between a single derogatory
comment and conditions that drive an employee to an emotional breakdown.
264 Id. at 23.
265 Id. ("These [factors] may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance").
2 66 R.A.V.v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377,389-90 (1992) (stating that Title VII does not
violate the Court's holding in R.A. V that content-based speech restrictions violate the First
Amendment). It has been suggested that Justice Scalia wrote the R.A. V opinion as a way of
attacking the promulgation of hate speech codes at universities around the country. See
WEINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 63. It is ironic, therefore, that while possibly attacking college
hate speech codes, Justice Scalia drafted a blueprint for speech code proponents to follow to
help the regulations pass constitutional muster. Id. at 63-64.
267 See UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (listing three reasons why the court was unwilling to apply Title VII to
campus hate speech codes).
268 See id. at 1181; see also Lange, supra note 251, at 125-26 (offering six similarities
between the workplace and the school setting: (1) both employees and students routinely
encounter the same people; (2) both employee and student group compositions routinely
change due to promotions, graduations, terminations, and dropouts; (3) both students and
employees are involved in particular activities within a larger organization; (4) both employees
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employer to correct situations of harassment, Title VII law does not apply equally
to school environments. 269
The UWM court stated three reasons why Title VII does not justify campus
hate speech codes. First, Title VII was created to address discrimination in the
employment setting and not in the educational setting 270 Second, the court stated
that Title VII law is based on principal-agent theory, which does not exist in the
school setting because normally students are not agents of a school.271 Finally, the
court found that Title VII could not be used to uphold the school's speech code
because Title VII is merely a statute, and therefore, "it cannot supersede the
requirements of the First Amendment."272 Thus, this federal district court
analyzed the use of Title VII as a justification for a university's hate speech code,
and explicitly rejected this theory.
3. What Title V[IBrings to the Tinker-Title VI Theory
Title VII provides proponents of campus hate speech codes with a framework
for regulating hate speech. One of the infirmities of code justifications in Phase I
was that the regulations restricted speech in ways that courts found to be
unconstitutional.273 In Harris, the Supreme Court upheld the limitations placed
upon speech by Title V1L 2 74 Thus, it can be inferred that if proponents of speech
codes can develop a justification for implementing a Title VII-type policy on
college campuses, such a policy could satisfy constitutional scrutiny.
The problem with the University of Wisconsin's use of Title VII in justifying
its hate speech code was that the school attempted to analogize the workplace to
the school setting. 275 The court was unwilling to accept the school's analogy. If
another court accepts this analogy, however, it will do so with the knowledge that
and students share common goals and experiences; (5) both employees and students experience
a limited number of altemative work or school options; and (6) both the workplace and school
setting are discrete and definable experiences).
269 UWM, 774 F. Supp. at 1177.
270 Id. It is worth noting, although the Wisconsin court did not, that Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act specifically addresses gender discrimination in the educational setting. See 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1991). This could be an example of the doctrine of expressio unius for
statutory interpretation, that is, the inclusion of one thing means the exclusion of the other.
Thus, Congress was aware that discrimination exists in school settings, but chose to limit the
reach of the Civil Rights Act in school settings to gender discrimination.
271 UJM 774F. Supp. at 1177.
272 Id.
273 See, e.g., supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
274Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (explaining that there is a
difference between "a mere offensive utterance" and conduct that rises to the level of creating a
hostile work environment).275See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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the UWM precedent exists. The inker-Title VII theory does not rely upon this
analogy for its validity.
C. Bringing the Two Prongs of the Theory Together
The TYinker-Title VII Theory is quite simple in practice. It says that campus
speech that materially and substantially interferes with the operation of a school
can be limited and uses Title VII to define what speech actually materially and
substantially interferes with the operation of a school. Thus, the Tinker prong
contributes a First Amendment justification and the Title VII prong adds a
constitutionally-accepted framework for determining what speech can be limited
by the campus speech code. Under this theory, each prong is responsible for its
own aspect of the justification, but neither is responsible for the entire
constitutional justification for a campus speech code. Unlike in Phase I, the
Tinker-Title VII theory is not overbroad because neither prong oversteps the
boundaries that the Supreme Court has defined.
The key to implementing the lInker-Title VII theory is to accept the
proposition that what violates the framework of Title VII also qualifies as a
material and substantial disruption to a school's operations. In a 1996 federal
district court case, the judge cited a 1993 survey that found eighty-five percent of
girls and seventy-six percent of boys reported that they had been victims of
unwanted sexual comments or touching in school.2 76 The judge used this statistic
to find that schools are on notice that student-on-student sexual harassment is
common in schools and, thus, schools have a duty to create and implement
policies for dealing with these situations.2 77 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
held that a school can be held liable for allowing a hostile environment to exist on
its grounds.278 If courts are going to hold schools liable for allowing a hostile
environment to exist, then it only makes sense that schools should be able to enact
rules that ban conduct creating such environments.
By holding schools liable for the hostile environments that exist on their
campuses, courts have implicitly held that such environments materially and
substantially interfere with the operation of the school. The Office for Civil Rights
has stated that harassment substantially interferes with a student's academic
performance and her physical and emotional well-being.279 Thus, if a hostile
environment materially and substantially interferes with the operation of a school,
276 Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
277 Id at 1426.
278 See Franldin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (concluding that
damages can be awarded for a violation of Title IX).
279 See Office for Civil Rights; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,034 (Mar. 13,
1997) (stating that the elimination of sexual harassment is needed to ensure a safe learning
environment exists).
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the school has a First Amendment justification for limiting speech creating such
an environment in a school setting according to Tinker. Then, by using Title VII
law, schools should have a constitutional framework for determining what speech
creates a hostile environment.
In 1993, the EEOC proposed a comprehensive set of guidelines for defining
workplace harassment, which was meant to cover harassment on the basis ofrace,
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.280 The EEOC defined
harassment as
verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an
individual because of his/her race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or
disability, or that of his/her relatives, friends, or associates, and that
(i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment;
(ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance; or
(iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.2 81
The EEOC's guidelines also provide a non-exhaustive list of conduct which
could be deemed harassing, including the making of epithets and slurs and
posting written or graphic materials that denigrate on the basis of one of the
protected classes. 282 Under the EEOC's guidelines, jokes and pranks that are
denigrating with regard to one of the protected characteristics are sanctionable.2 83
In determining whether a violation of the guidelines has occurred,284 courts
should look to the totality of the circumstances.2 85 Although a single act will
280 Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin,
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, 51269 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Proposed
Harassment Guidelines]. See also supra note 255 (stating that although these proposed rules are
not binding on courts they should be used for guidance).281 Id.
282 Id
283 Id. at 51,269 n.3; see, e.g., DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F3d 298, 310 (1st Cir. 1997);
Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094 (2nd Cir. 1986); Rochon v. FBI, 691 F. Supp. 1548
(D.D.C. 1988).
284 It is important to note that the EEOC bases employer's liability on agency principles,
which was explicitly rejected by the UWM court when applied to the university setting because
normally students are not agents of their school. Compare Proposed Harassment Guidelines,
58 Fed. Reg. at 51,268 with UWM, 774 F. Supp. at 1177. However, the 7nker-Title VII test
does not necessarily need to rely upon the Title VII prong for university liability. Rather, as
discussed above, schools are on notice that this type of harassment occurs on their campus and
courts have been willing to hold schools liable for it. See supra notes 276-78 and
accompanying text. Thus, the UWM court's concern about analogizing Title VII workplace
provisions to the school setting is dissipated by the Tinker-Title VII theory.
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usually not constitute harassment, it is possible that an isolated incident can be so
egregious that it will be considered a violation.286 Additionally, the EEOC did not
intend to limit violations to conduct directed at specific individuals, and therefore,
an employee would have standing to bring suit even if she were not the intended
target of the harassing conduct 287 Thus, looking at the totality of the
circumstances, it is possible that harassing conduct targeted at one individual
could create a hostile environment for another.2 88
D. Applying the Tinker-Title VI Theory to Wayne Dick's Posters
If Wayne Dick had placed his BAD posters around the campus of a public
university with a hate speech code based upon the Tinker-Title VII theory, what
result would have occurred?289 This is the question the final section of Part III
attempts to answer.
First, the Tinker prong provides that the school would be justified in limiting
speech that substantially and materially interferes with either the administration of
the school or the rights of other students.2 90 Speech that creates a hostile
environment is deemed to substantially and materially interfere with the
administration of the school and/or the rights of other students, and thus can be
limited under the Tinker prong of the analysis.2 91 This begs the question: Did
Dick's posters create a hostile environment?
285 See Proposed Harassment Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,268; see, e.g., DeNovellif,
124 F3d at 311 (noting that the plaintiff "correctly points out that the court must focus on the
work atmosphere as a whole!).
2 86 See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n.4 (7th Cir. 1991)
(performing a KKK ritual in the workplace creates a hostile environment); Vance v. S. Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1989) (hanging a noose from a light fixture
above an employee's work station was clearly sufficient to establish a harassment violation).
2 87 See Proposed Harassment Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,268.
288 This makes a great deal of sense because at the very least one can imagine what it
would be like to work in an environment where someone similarly situated is being harassed.
The thought that when they finish with her, they will come to me next must come to mind. Not
to mention one might find the harassment of a coworker very offensive. The problem is, of
course, magnified if the harasser is a supervisor.
289 Technically, the EEOC's proposed guidelines would not protect employees from
harassment based upon sexual orientation, unless the harassment also involves conduct of a
sexual nature, however nothing would stop a university from adding sexual orientation to the
list of covered forms of harassment Proposed Harassment Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,266.
It will be assumed that the hypothetical university that Wayne Dick now attends protects
against harassing speech based on sexual orientation.
2 90 See supra Part III.A.3.
2 91 See supra Part III.C.
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Under the Title VII prong, 92 a person becomes a harasser if their conduct
meets any one of three requirements:
1) creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
2) unreasonably interferes with an individual's work performance
3) adversely affects another's opportunities 293
To begin, if the posters were found to violate one of the above requirements,
Wayne Dick could not use the defense that he was only joking.2 94 The fact that
the posters targeted a group rather than a specific individual aids Dick's defense,
but does not completely exonerate him.295 Similarly, Dick is not exonerated by
the fact that his posters represent a single act.2 9 6
Starting with the third requirement, it would seem difficult to believe that any
student lost an opportunity because of Dick's posters. This requirement would
most likely be used to punish speech that kept a student from participating in an
activity or from receiving an award or other type of recognition. Dick's posters
would probably not violate the second requirement either. To say that posters
displayed in a few places around school unreasonably interferes with a student's
292 There is some discussion that codes based on Title VII may be unconstitutional in the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In
R.A. V., the Court strongly rejected the idea that the government could differentiate speech on
the basis of its viewpoint. Id. at 381. The decision specifically mentions that Title VII does not
violate the holding of R.A. V. because Title VII is directed toward conduct and not speech. Id. at
389-90. Title VII-based speech codes, however, do target speech. Thus, at the very least, Title
VII-based speech codes should be enforced equally against harassing speech by members of the
majority and members of the minority. Otherwise, Title VII-based speech codes would be
limiting only a particular viewpoint of harassing speech while allowing another, which is the
problem the Court had in R.A. V. See id. at 386. ("[T]he power to proscribe particular speech on
the basis of a noncontent element... does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of a
content element .... ."). Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a content-
neutral ban on targeted residential picketing) with Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)
(invalidating a ban on residential picketing that exempted labor picketing). Frisby and Carey
demonstrate the distinction between the govemment regulating speech on a neutral basis and
the government demonstrating favoritism toward certain messages.
2 93 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
2 94 See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
29 5 See Proposed Harassment Guidelines, 58 Fed. at 51,268 (providing that "employees
have standing to challenge a hostile or abusive work environment even if the harassment is not
targeted specifically at them"); Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that sexual graffiti in the workplace was relevant to plaintiffs hostile work
environment claim even though the graffiti was not directed specifically at her); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (one "category of
actionable conduct is behavior that is not directed at a particular individual or group of
individuals but is disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one" group).29 6 See supra note 286 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that a single incident
may constitute harassment).
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work performance appears to stretch the requirement too far.297 To punish Wayne
Dick for his poster under this prong would lead to the punishment of any poster a
group of students found offensive.2 98 The key language to the second requirement
is the '"nreasonably interfered" clause. Simply seeing a sign posted on a campus
bulletin board could not constitute such an event that a reasonable student is
unable to perform his or her schoolwork.299 Additionally, there is no evidence
that any specific student suffered injury beyond finding the sign offensive.
The first requirement of the Title VII prong is perhaps the most general
because many things could be considered offensive or hostile.300 For example,
although the GLAD posters probably would not have been considered hostile to
29 7 The Seventh Circuit held that a court should analyze harassment allegations by
applying both a subjective and an objective standard. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d
1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991). By analyzing allegations in this manner, a court will be able to give
weight to the victim's injury while at the same time considering the situation against a
reasonable standard. Id. at 1272. If the court finds the situation violates both a subjective and
objective standard, the plaintiff has alleged a violation of Title VII. Neither the subjective nor
the objective standard appears to have been violated by hanging these posters. The posters were
displayed in a single incident, and stated the author's opinion about a controversial topic.
Moreover, Dick's posters appeared without any sign of threatening behavior to follow. Thus, it
appears the posters fail the objective element of the analysis. Additionally, other than the fact
that the posters offended people, there is no evidence that this incident caused anyone harm.
Therefore, the incident also fails the subjective element of the analysis.
298 Remember that Wayne Dick said he had found other posters displayed on campus to
be offensive. See supra note 20. If mere offensiveness were the sole standard, the analysis
would not contain any objective element and would essentially result in giving every member
of the community a "heckler's veto" over every other member's speech. See supra note 297
(discussing the objective element of Title VII analysis). See also supra note 143 (discussing the
heckler's veto).
299 For an example of what would constitute a violation of the second requirement see the
facts of Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 970 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing
a situation that led a student to stop attending her English class after her professor refused to
stop using profanity, discussing topics of a sexual nature, assigning writing projects on
controversial topics, and directing humiliating comments at her and other female students).
300 The way one views the academic setting will greatly influence her analysis of whether
a situation rises to a sufficient level to establish a violation of a Title VII-based speech code.
One way of analyzing the situation would be to say that it takes a higher degree of
offensiveness or hostility to constitute a violation in the school setting than it would in the
workplace because universities are generally more committed to the concept of open discourse
than employers. See supra note 36. Another way of analyzing the situation would be to say that
the burden is lower in the school setting because generally students are younger and require
more protection than employees. The university can be pictured in a more patemalistic light
than the normal employer, and thus feel an obligation to protect its students from harm. The
way a school's administration chooses to view its position will greatly influence how it
interprets possible violations. Both views are rationally based. I would simply suggest that if a
school were to choose to follow the second view, it could avoid the hypocritical position that
the University of Michigan took when drafting its code. See supra notes 16 and 83.
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Wayne Dick, he clearly found them offensive.3 01 To violate the first requirement
of the Title V1 prong takes more than simply doing something offensive or
hostile, because one must also create an intimidating, hostile, environment 302 To
say that Dick's posters created a hostile environment would probably also stretch
the requirement too far.303 This is where the fact that the posters were not targeted
at an individual and were posted in an isolated incident becomes significant. To
say that Dick's posters all by themselves created a general environment of
hostility probably gives Wayne Dick more credit than he deserves.
Thus, under the Tinker-Title VII theory Wayne Dick would not have been
punished for posting the BAD signs around campus. According to the First
Amendment this is the correct result. Dick's parody was his opinion on a public
event. Although he meant to be offensive and probably a little bit hostile, one
could hardly say that he created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment. Also, it is difficult to see how his poster prevented anyone on
campus from being able to do schoolwork or adversely affected anyone's chance
at a particular opportunity.
IV. CONCLUSION-THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION OF ALL
This note has attempted to explain why Phase I of the campus hate speech
code debate came to an end and in which direction proponents of such codes
should move in the future. Along the way, the note suggested a possible speech
code that would withstand constitutional scrutiny. This note will end by
addressing the most important question in the entire debate-should we?
Undoubtedly, every college administrator in recent years has considered the
question: "Should we create a hate speech code for our university?" This question
leads to thousands of related issues, but these issues boil down to one-should
we?
Pretending for a moment that the First Amendment does not exist thus
simplifying the problem greatly, should we create a campus hate speech code?
Clearly, hate speech has the ability to injure its targets, and we should want to
301 What is interesting is that as I write this, I cannot imagine Wayne Dick finding the
GLAD posters hostile in the least bit, but I can see the members of GLAD perceiving Dick's
posters as hostile. Perhaps this is because Dick's poster can be seen as being aggressive, where
GLAD's is merely an advertisement. Or maybe it is because Dick is a member of the majority
and GLAD is a group of minority students. This dichotomy demonstrates what a powerful
weapon satire can be because Dick probably meant to show hostility toward a group ith which
he vehemently disagrees.
302 See, e.g., DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F3d 298, 311 (1st Cir. 1997) ('In determining
whether harassment on the job is sufficiently severe or pervasive to rise to the level of a Title
VII violation, courts look to the gravity as well as the frequency of the offensive conduct."); see
also Nazaire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 807 F.2d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that a
small number of minor racial incidents does not rise to the level of a Title VII violation).
303 See supra note 297.
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protect them from this harm. Of course, we want to teach those with hateful
thoughts that these ideas are not correct Without a doubt, we want to stamp out
racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of hateful ideologies. If these are
our goals, will a campus hate speech code help us to achieve them?
Certainly, a speech code, by purifying the air around campus will protect
minorities on campus from hateful speech,304 but this will also drive the hate
underground where it will be able to fester in secret. For those students who are
punished under the code, do we think they will change their beliefs because of
this punishment? Do we think Wayne Dick changed his opinion of homosexuality
after the Yale disciplinary procedure? Speech codes have absolutely no chance of
bringing people with different viewpoints together. Speech codes may
demonstrate that the school strongly disapproves of hateful speech, but there are
other ways that the school can accomplish this feat. The school can choose a
method that empowers students,305 rather than the paternalistic scheme of
creating an artificially pure atmosphere through the creation of a campus speech
code.
When the First Amendment is added back into the mix, school administrators
face two problems. One, the First Amendment places restrictions on the
effectiveness of any speech code implemented by the university. If the only
speech codes that will pass constitutional scrutiny are ineffective at actually
purifying the campus' air, speech regulations become merely a symbolic gesture
of the school's disapproval of this speech.306 Two, there is a fundamental tension
created when a school dedicated to open discourse and the exchange of ideas
attempts to limit the speech of its students. As Benno Schmidt, the man who
succeeded A. Bartlett Giamatti as President of Yale University, stated, "we cannot
censor or suppress speech in a university, no matter how obnoxious its content,
without violating the principle that is our justification for existence."307 With or
without the First Amendment, in the end, each of us is left with the question-
should we?
304 Of course, purifying the campus air may also silence voices of social change. Often,
tension and controversy act as a catalyst. College campuses have traditionally been a platform
where differing views can be expressed. A purified campus cannot provide such a platform. For
example, a purified campus would, at the very least stifle, and at most prosecute a young
Malcolm X.
30 5 See supra note 60 (describing the approach taken at Arizona State University).
306 It could be argued this is a good enough reason, but the problem is that it creates First
Amendment martyrs like Wayne Dick. Dick's story received national attention not because of
the offensive nature of his posters, but because the school tried to punish him for posting them.
Some people will overlook the fact that the posters were offensive and simply focus on the
school's attempt to punish the student At Arizona State, the school was able to condemn the
offensive speech and get the rest of campus to do so as well (including the students who hung
the offensive sign in the first place) without ever actually disciplining anyone. See supra note
60.
307 HENTOFF, supra note 2, at 132.
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